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South Africa’s reintegration into the global economy post-1994 has not produced the expected levels 
of industrialisation and growth-enhancing structural transformation that has traditionally been 
achieved by developed countries in the past. South Africa faces the triple challenge of poverty, 
inequality and unemployment and needs structural growth that is inclusive and sustainable. However, 
trying to emulate the traditional structural transformative growth paths that developed countries have 
followed previously, will prove unsuccessful due to changes in the global economy. This paper, 
therefore, argues that an alternate growth path is needed, especially given that global warming and 
the effects of climate change act as a threat multiplier to economic growth and development. 
Furthermore, the world economy is shifting away from fossil fuels and resource depletion towards 
greener technologies and products. South Africa needs to adopt a growth path that accounts for the 
current climate and global context to ensure sustainable and inclusive growth for future 
competitiveness. This paper, using the Economic Complexity Methodology, identifies green industries 
that South Africa is best positioned to develop and grow given the existing knowledge and capabilities 
within the economy. A case study is conducted on the wind-power industry which proves to be a 
promising option given South Africa’s current economic climate and the potential for employment 
creation. This paper aims to highlight the opportunities for the development of green industries in 
South Africa and the limitations that hinder this potential. 
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When South Africa was reintegrated into the global economy at the turn of the millennium, few would 
have predicted that 25 years on, it would still face the triple challenge of poverty, inequality and 
unemployment. It would have been expected that structural transformation of the country’s economy 
would have shifted from low-productivity sectors to high-productivity sectors as per the traditional 
Lewis dual-economy model. However, premature deindustrialisation, the impact of globalisation (both 
internationally and domestically) and more recently, global warming and the effects of climate change, 
pose a serious threat to current economic growth and development. 
Carlota Perez (2012) argues that growth in the world economy occurs in surges that last for 
approximately half a century. These surges are driven by a technological revolution which completely 
transforms societies, production, technology, systems of organisation, distribution and communication 
systems. The Industrial Revolution is just one of the examples used in her theory. She argues that 
the process of adopting the new and unlearning the old takes between 20 to 30 years – a term coined 
‘creative destruction’ by the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter. This is the process of destroying 
the old and innovating, creating something new. Once this process has occurred, countries enter into 
a new paradigm where new technologies operate at higher levels of productivity and where innovation 
is gained and shared (Perez, 2012). This is followed by a golden age lasting approximately 30 years. 
Perez (2012) believes that the next golden age will be driven by “green” innovation in order to be 
sustainable and feasible. This era will radically transform lifestyles, incorporating millions into this 
revolution (Perez, 2012). According to Perez (2012), we are on the cusp of a paradigm shift as 
evidenced by the global trends and the shift to cleaner technologies.  
The global environment has changed and while globalisation has contributed to efficiencies in 
production and allowed for technology transfer, the manner in which countries have integrated into 
the global economy is important (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). Given the global shift towards 
sustainability, South Africa needs to adopt a “greener” industrialisation path encompassing greener 
goods and production techniques in order to compete globally, create employment in activities which 
will have longevity and to ensure that structural transformation is sustainable and growth-enhancing. 
In South Africa, the green sector shows enormous potential for growth and employment and has the 
potential to improve South Africa’s trade balance by increasing exports of green goods and services 
while simultaneously reducing its dependency on energy imports. It is important however, that 
diversification in green products is aligned with South Africa’s existing capabilities and vision for job 
creation. Transitioning towards a green economy will involve the transformation of economic activities 




and production structures globally. This shift could alter the global competitive landscape, reshaping 
the comparative advantages in production of countries (Fankhauser et al., 2013).  
This thesis, using the Economic Complexity Methodology developed by Ricardo Hausmann and 
Cesar Hidalgo, will seek to answer the following questions: 
1. In South Africa’s current productive structure, what are the “green products” that have potential 
to diversify South Africa’s export product mix and provide opportunities for further growth and 
employment? 
2. Once identified, what are the opportunities and barriers for this growth and how might South 
Africa re-orient its industrial structure to become more competitive in these “green” products 
and reinvigorate industry in a way that aligns with sustainable development? 
To answer these questions, the tools of complexity analysis derived from the Atlas of Economic 
Complexity (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014), will be used to look at South Africa’s productive 
capabilities relative to the green economy. The economic complexity methodology provides 
information about a country’s industrial structure and productive capabilities through relative 
comparisons of country export baskets using international trade data from UN Comtrade (Hidalgo et 
al., 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009; Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014). This data reflects the 
period 1995-2017 for 128 countries (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014)1. Countries that are too small 
in terms of their export base, or countries with highly unreliable data are excluded to ensure the 
integrity of calculations and accurate findings. Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) found that over time as 
countries grew and developed, the products countries produced diversified and often became more 
complex. That is to say that their export baskets diversified. Developed economies tended to export 
a wide range of products whilst developing countries tended to export a narrow few (Hausmann and 
Chauvin, 2015). Furthermore, the products exported by developed economies were generally more 
complex and scarcer (only made by a few other countries) compared to developing countries’ 
products which tended to be relatively simple and ubiquitous (made by several countries). Using this 
analysis, structural transformation is thereby the process whereby countries accumulate productive 
capabilities and move into producing increasingly complex products. 
For the purpose of this paper, a subset of 248 “green” products are identified from South Africa’s 
export basket to analyse the potential for growth in green industries in South Africa. Using the 
economic complexity methodology (Hidalgo at al., 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009; Hausmann, 
 
1 The selection criteria includes all countries with GDP and export information, a population above 1,200,000, a trade 
value above $1 billion and reliable data (excluding Chad, Iraq and Macau). The 128 countries that remain after these 
filters are applied comprise 99% of global trade, 97% of global GDP and 95% of the global population (Hausmann, 
Hidalgo et al., 2014). 
 




Hidalgo et al., 2014) and applying it to South African products, “frontier” green products will be 
identified. Once these frontier “green” products have been identified, the opportunities for 
diversification and growth in these green industries, will be explored in the product space which 
graphically shows a country’s productive structure and further predicts a country’s potential for growth 
and diversification. This process will allow for the assessment of South Africa’s current green 
production capabilities and identify opportunities for diversification into green industries that South 
Africa is best placed to move into given its current productive capabilities. These findings will be 
supplemented with current economic information and interviews to inform the feasibility of these 
options and provide insight into the optimal direction for green industrial policy. In addition to the 
exploration of South Africa’s potential for green growth and identification of potential industries and 
products, the consideration of employment opportunities will form a focal point of investigation given 
South Africa’s high rate of unemployment. 
The outline of this paper is structured as follows: Chapter 1 gives an overview of the historical 
background following South Africa’s reintegration into the global economy, looking specifically at the 
challenges to structural transformation. Chapter 2 briefly highlights the developing global trends in the 
green economy. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the economic complexity framework developed 
by Cesar A. Hidalgo and Ricardo Hausmann and places it within the development literature. Chapter 
4 builds on the economic complexity framework and introduces the concept of the Product Space as 
a way of predicting a country’s diversification path and structural transformational opportunities. South 
Africa’s product space will be located and analysed according to its structural transformation since 
1995. Chapter 5 provides the conceptual basis for green growth and environmental goods and gives 
an overview of the data that will be used. It will then expand on the methodology for the creation of 
the product space and provide the foundation for South Africa’s green product space which will be 
developed and analysed using complexity analytics. South Africa’s green frontier products will be 
identified using the complexity methodology. From a list of 20 frontier green products, one 
product/industry will be selected based on the potential for growth in South Africa’s current political 
and economic context. A case study of this product will be explored in Chapter 6 which will expound 
on the potential for the growth of this product/industry, the potential for employment as well as the 
barriers and opportunities that exist. This case study will be substantiated by interviews as well as 








Chapter 1. Challenges to the Traditional Models of Structural 
Transformation 
 
South Africa’s reintegration into the global economy at the turn of the millennium has led to positive, 
albeit slow, economic growth. However, despite this positive economic growth, South Africa faces the 
triple challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment with industry failing to provide the jobs and 
growth that is generally expected. South Africa’s narrow unemployment rate was 27.6% in the first 
quarter of 2019 and the broad unemployment rate, which includes discouraged jobseekers, currently 
stands at 38% (StatsSA, 2019). Rodrik (2014) argues that manufacturing-led growth proves to be the 
most effective path to raise productivity and spur economic growth within a country. This process 
enables the structural transformation of a country’s economy, shifting it from low-productivity 
economic activities into higher-productivity activities. Historically, manufacturing has proven to be the 
most effective driver of growth with the Industrial Revolution enabling Europe and the United States 
to enter onto a path of sustained economic growth and productivity. Furthermore, industrialisation at 
the end of the 19th century and in the 1960’s, allowed non-Western countries such as Japan, Taiwan 
and South Korea to converge with the West (Rodrik, 2016). Not only is manufacturing able to absorb 
large quantities of unskilled labour, distinguishing it from other high-productivity sectors such as 
mining and finance, but it is also a tradeable sector enabling demand beyond domestic borders 
(Rodrik, 2016). The formal manufacturing sector also exhibits unconditional convergence which 
means that growth is independent of fundamentals such as strong institutions, thus proving to be a 
powerful engine of growth (Rodrik, 2016).  
However, despite the positive growth and structural transformation attributed to the industrial sector, 
deindustrialisation has become a global phenomenon. While this is to be expected of developed 
economies since this emulates the path of maturation as activities eventually move into the modern 
service sector, this trend is unusual for developing countries. These late industrialisers are de-
industrialising at lower levels of income and manufacturing employment, compared to those of 
developed countries (Rodrik, 2014). For example, in the United Kingdom and the United States, 
manufacturing reached its peak in 1953 and 1961 respectively, comprising a 25% and 35% share of 
the workforce with per capita incomes reaching $18 000 and $15 000 (Lawrence, 2018). However, in 
South Africa, manufacturing reached its peak in 1981 comprising a 17% share of the workforce with 
per capita income of $11 776 (Lawrence, 2018). Rodrik defines this as ‘premature deindustrialisation’ 
where developing countries are not undergoing the degree of structural transformation needed to 
move economies into higher levels of income and employment.  
Rodrik (2014) attributes this phenomenon of premature deindustrialisation to globalisation which has 
increased openness, global competition, technological changes and shifts in global demand. When 




looking at manufacturing as a percentage of GDP value-added, its share has decreased from 17.5% 
in 1997 to 15.6% in 2017 which seems to confirm this global phenomenon (World Bank Indicators, 
2019). However, manufacturing’s share of GDP when prices are kept constant at the 2010 level allows 
a more accurate indication of the changes in quantities of goods produced (UNIDO, 2017). When 
looking at these indicators, manufacturing’s share of real GDP has increased from US$7.84 trillion in 
1997 to US$12.27 trillion in 2017 (World Bank Indicators, 2019). Therefore, it is not that industrial 
activities have declined but rather, with globalisation and the rise of global value chains, these 
activities have been relocated to countries able to produce more efficiently and at a lower cost. For 
countries such as China, India and other Asian countries, globalisation has resulted in high-
productivity employment creation and structural change which has facilitated growth. These countries’ 
manufacturing sectors’ have undergone rapid growth with China experiencing manufacturing value-
added output of 12.8% annually and Asia accounting for 38% of global output, an increase of 12% 
since 2000 (Colotla et al., 2018; Romei and Reed, 2019).  Therefore, it can be argued that while 
globalisation has contributed to the general trend of deindustrialisation globally, this is as a result of 
the dispersion of production systems over borders through international subcontracting and direct 
investment. While developed countries were traditionally responsible for manufacturing, through 
globalisation, they have been able to increase efficiency through outsourcing production to countries 
such as China and India with lower labour costs, focusing their attention on other high-productivity 
activities such as design and marketing (Dalle et al., 2013). On the other hand, it can be argued that 
premature deindustrialisation for many developing countries is a direct function of China’s dominance 
in these industrial activities and an inability to compete with established manufacturing bases in China 
and parts of Asia.  
Structural transformation in South Africa and Africa at large has not followed the traditional Lewis 
dual-economy model of growth as other developed countries have in the past. The Lewis model 
highlights the heterogeneity in productive structures within the economy. Traditional sectors, such as 
agriculture, are defined by low-productivity activities while the modern sectors, such as manufacturing 
and services, are defined by high-productivity activities which drive rapid productivity growth, returns 
to scale and technological spillovers. Structural transformation occurs as the economy shifts from low-
productive to high-productive activities. However, a hallmark of economies in developing countries is 
not only the dispersion of productivity across the modern and the traditional sectors, but also the 
dispersion of activities within these sectors. For example, within the modern service sector which is 
meant to be characterised by high-productive activities, there exists both formal and informal 
activities, as well as activities which can and cannot be traded (Rodrik, 2014). In South Africa, while 
labour has moved out of the traditional low-productivity agricultural sector, it has not moved into the 
higher-productive manufacturing sector but rather, has been absorbed into the service sectors 
(Rodrik, 2014). This is problematic given that tradeable services high in productivity, such as the 




finance and insurance sectors, attract highly-skilled workers which only account for a small portion of 
South Africa’s labour force (Bhorat and Hodge, 1999; Bhorat and Rooney, 2017). As a result, jobs 
created in the low-productivity, often informal, service sectors are non-tradeable and consequently, 
do not provide opportunities for exponential growth (Quak, 2015). For this reason, structural 
transformation in South Africa has not been growth-enhancing as the Lewis model suggests but 
rather, has been growth-reducing as labour has moved into lower-productivity service activities 
(McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). The traditional dual-economy model fails to account for the rising level 
of informality within the modern sector. This trend continues to entrench inequality as pockets of 
modernisation develop alongside growing informality as surplus labour is absorbed into the low-
productivity activities within the service sector, preventing growth-enhancing structural transformation 
(Quak, 2015).  
For South Africa, the rise of globalisation has not only increased competition globally but also 
domestically as China’s export competitiveness has infiltrated local markets. Furthermore, since 
globalisation promotes specialisation according to a country’s comparative advantage, South Africa, 
a country well-endowed with natural resources has had less incentive to diversify and strengthen its 
modern manufacturing base (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011; Morris and Fessehaie, 2014). This, coupled 
with China’s growing demand for natural resources as it develops, has led to an over-reliance on 
natural resource exports for South Africa. Furthermore, the economic slowdown after the financial 
crisis in 2008 coupled with fierce competition globally makes the traditional trajectory of structural 
transformation difficult to emulate. It is clear that South Africa cannot follow the same traditional 
manufacturing growth path of structural transformation that developed countries have followed in the 
past. However, despite this trend, industrial policy for South Africa continues to target the 
manufacturing sector, viewing it as the key to unlocking South Africa’s growth path and structurally 
transforming the economy into one that yields high growth and is labour absorbing.  
While South Africa and other developing economies try to catch-up to the level of industrialisation 
achieved by developed economies, the world is changing. Global warming and the effects of climate 
change pose a serious threat to economic growth and development. A degrading biophysical 
environment constrains livelihoods and limits economic growth. The increasingly felt consequences 
of climate change will likely accelerate this change. Globally, there is a general consensus that a shift 
away from fossil fuels and resource depletion towards greener technologies and products is a 
necessary step and solutions must be sought to prevent and limit the rise in temperature (UNECA, 
2016). In developing countries however, environmental protection is often seen as a luxury that should 
be dealt with only at later stages of development once more pressing issues such as unemployment 
and poverty, have been resolved (Altenburg and Assmann, 2017). Unfortunately, economic prosperity 
is not disconnected from environmental protection. In fact, it is argued that green growth can in some 
cases drive growth (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011; World Bank, 2017; Jacobs, 2012). Furthermore, 




since many developing countries rely on economic activities in forestry, agriculture and fisheries, 
environmental degradation undermines the ecological foundations essential for economic growth and 
human welfare. Pollution and waste are also indicative of inefficiencies in production. Trying to follow 
in the industrialisation path undertaken by developed countries, while the dominant economic actors 
are shifting towards greener production techniques and goods, will ultimately drive a wedge between 
global and local practices (Altenburg and Assmann, 2017). This is already evident as developed 
countries are increasingly imposing stricter environmental regulations and standards on imports and 
exports (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2017). This makes it difficult for smaller producers to compete or even 
participate given that stricter regulations can increase the costs of production. Furthermore, in many 
developing and low-income countries, the skills and knowledge required to impose certain standards 
and regulations, do not exist (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2017), and consequently, in order to compete, 
many of these countries are forced to export to poorer markets that do not require these standards 
and regulations (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2017). These environmental standards will only increase, 
making it even harder for developing countries to compete thus limiting the markets available for 
exports in the future. For this reason, developing countries need to avoid being locked into a growth 
path which encompasses unsustainable infrastructure and business practices that will make it difficult 
to transform economic structures in the future (Altenburg and Assmann, 2017).  
 
Chapter 2. Global Trends in the Green Economy 
 
The idea of a green economy and green growth is underpinned by sustainability in development and 
green industrialisation (UNECA, 2016). The process of greening industrialisation ensures that both 
growth and structural transformation are geared towards the efficient use of resources, reducing 
negative environmental impacts and cutting down on harmful emissions and waste overall (UNECA, 
2016). The environmental agenda cannot be considered separate from the green economy agenda 
but rather, the two need to be intertwined with green growth providing jobs in an economy which 
protects the environment and ensures sustainability. Those that advocate for green growth should not 
view protection and management of the environment as another economic sector running parallel to 
conventional economic activity (Fankhauser, 2013). Rather, it should encompass all activities within 
an economy. Sustainable development, therefore, cannot be mutually exclusive from a green 
economy since the two are complementary. The economic changes required to combat the effects of 
climate change are not minor but transformative and system-wide (Perez, 2010). Therefore, a green 
economy encompasses the production processes and product mix of the whole economy and not 
only a few sectors (Fankhauser, 2013). Smart industrial policy is about anticipating future markets 
and adapting to them. Therefore, should South Africa continue to target the revival of the 




manufacturing sector as an avenue for growth, this needs to be accomplished through the lens of 
green growth in order to develop competitiveness in current and future markets and enable 
sustainable economic growth. 
Economic growth and environmental management are becoming increasingly connected in policy 
discussions globally. In Europe, the creation of new market opportunities is an explicit objective of 
green growth policies (Fankhauser, 2013). The Chinese have promoted seven strategic industries 
which include environmental protection, clean energy and cars in the hopes that it can become a 
leader in green growth (Fankhauser, 2013). Green growth is also a strategic priority for South Korea. 
This shift towards greener growth globally, and specifically by China, South Korea and Europe, is 
evidenced by the rising global trade in environmental goods (EGs) as shown in Figure 1. According 
to the OECD Report on a set Policy Indicators for Trade and the Environment (2019), between 2003 
and 2016, global trade in environmentally related goods has more than doubled. In numbers, this is 
an increase from USD 531.10 billion in 2003 to USD 1 261.24 billion in 2016 (OECD, 2019). This 
growth has largely been driven by EGs related to renewable energy, wastewater management, and 
treatment and management of solid, hazardous waste and recycling systems (OECD, 2019). As seen 
in Figure 1, South Africa’s total percentage of green exports has decreased from 2003 to 2017. This 
is also the case for the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Since demand for EGs is 
increasing, this could mean that these countries become less competitive in the future. Alternatively, 
countries shown in Figure 1 (Japan, Germany, South Korea, Italy, China, Mexico and the Netherlands) 
that have increased the intensity of their green exports could prove to be more competitive in the 
current and future global trading regime given their increasing intensity towards EGs production and 














Figure 1. Top 10 Green Intensive Exporters by Country in 2017 Compared to South Africa (Green 
Exports as a percentage (%) of Total Exports) 
 
Source: (Own calculations using Comtrade data) 
This growth in environmental trade is consistent with global trends in energy generation and 
consumption as countries are increasingly shifting towards renewable energy, particularly in the 
generation of electricity (OECD, 2019). With increasing levels of globalisation and interconnectedness 
as evidenced in the fragmentation of global value chains since the 1970s (Kaplinsky and Morris, 
2001), it is clear that countries’ export sectors will be, and are currently, affected by global trends. 
Environmental regulations and requirements are becoming more prominent and are being imposed 
by more and more leading importers. For example, many countries such as Canada and certain 
countries in the European Union, have developed national policies that stipulate that environmental 
impact assessments must be carried out prior to signing any trade agreement (Afesorgbor and 
Demena, 2018). This means that any country entering into a trade agreement with these countries, 
has to sign environmental cooperation deals. This presents an opportunity of aligning productive 
activities to global standards, stimulating the use of cleaner technologies and production processes 
along supply chains. Alternatively, it also has the potential to harm supply chains and competitiveness 
should countries not conform to these emerging standards.  
While South Africa’s development path has historically centred on emission-intensive mining and 
energy industries which are high emitters of greenhouse gas (GHG), there have been commitments 
towards addressing climate change through the transition towards an inclusive, climate-resilient and 




environmentally sustainable economy (Black et al., 2017). This commitment is embedded in national 
policy which is promoting the greening of various sectors in the economy to support the creation of 
jobs and efficient production processes while reducing waste, GHG emissions and pollution (Black et 
al., 2017). The fruition of these commitments, however, has been slow with concerns over coal sector 
job losses and employment generation remaining at the forefront of the debate. Africa and South 
Africa face many domestic challenges in addition to playing ‘catch-up’ to the developed world in terms 
of industry. However, South Africa, and Africa at large, are placed in a unique position for sustainable 
development and green transformation given the relative lack of industrialisation and existing 
infrastructure compared to that of developed countries. Consequently, South Africa is not locked into 
a path-dependent growth trajectory and has the opportunity to adopt a green growth strategy, 
promoting the production of green products and positioning its economy up for future success and 
competitiveness. The green economy presents an opportunity for South Africa to develop a growth 
path which is sustainable and inclusive while also enabling it to leapfrog into the fourth industrial 
revolution.  
 
Chapter 3. The Economic Complexity Method:  An Overview 
 
3.1 Economic Growth 
 
The first generation of economic growth models used two different approaches to explain growth. The 
first focused on the dual characteristics of the economy (Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1961). In these 
models, the economy consists of a traditional (agriculture) and modern (industry) sector. While the 
traditional sector was viewed to be primitive in its use of technology, the modern sector was viewed 
to be the productive sector characterised by innovation and capital accumulation (Fortunato et al., 
2018). Therefore, economic growth is dependent on the rate at which labour and productive resources 
move into the modern sector from the low-productivity traditional sector (Fortunato et al., 2018). This 
is the process of structural transformation. Through this process, static and dynamic gains are 
generated. Static gains relate to the increase in labour productivity as workers are employed in more 
productive sectors. Dynamic gains relate to the acquisition of skills and upgrading over time due to 
access to better technologies on the accumulation of capabilities (Fortunato et al., 2018). The 
neoclassical growth models of Solow, and later variants, forms the second generation of economic 
growth models. According to these models, various economic activities are viewed as being 
structurally similar. Therefore, these different activities can be aggregated into a single representative 
sector. Growth then, depends on various factors such as savings, capital accumulation (both human 




and physical) and innovation. In this sense, economic growth is the process of transformation within 
a sector (Fortunato et al., 2018).  
However, the authors of the complexity methodology, argue that economic growth theory has been 
limited by the use of simplified aggregate factors to explain economic growth. These theories fail to 
capture the complexities and knowledge that cannot be accounted for. In this way, economic 
development has been framed as a problem of accumulation, as opposed to a problem of increased 
diversity (Simoes and Hidalgo, 2011). Furthermore, the traditional theorising on structural 
transformation is too simplistic and does not account for countries’ unique contexts and capabilities 
that inform future growth. The economic complexity methodology aims to create a bridge that allows 
for the marrying of economic theory and existing data, providing an alternative way of thinking about 
how a country undergoes structural transformation to develop and grow. Instead of focusing on 
aggregate growth to understand development, the focus is placed on the complexity of an economy 
and the existing embedded knowledge within, and how to exploit this in order to develop (Hausmann, 
Hidalgo et al., 2014). There is a shift from focusing purely on growth in terms of increasing productivity, 
through the accumulation of factors of production (human and capital), towards focusing on the 
accumulation of productive activities and knowledge within complex networks to determine the 
potential for economic growth and development (Hausmann and Chauvin, 2015). In this way, growth 
is not attributed to producing more output but rather, producing increasingly diverse products (and 
services) which do not currently exist given that these techniques and capabilities have yet to be 
acquired. The focus for economic growth is placed on analysing the complexity of an economy which 
is directly related to the amount of valuable knowledge embedded within (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 
2014). Therefore, the composition of a country’s productive output is indicative of the structures 
existent that hold and combine knowledge. Development and growth are therefore achieved through 
productive agents, such as entrepreneurs, accessing networks of productive capabilities or “know-
how.” 
Hausmann (2016) argues that economic growth emphasises the importance of technical progress 
which is based on tools/embedded knowledge, recipes/blueprints/codified knowledge and know-
how/tacit knowledge (Hausmann, 2016). Hausmann defines know-how as tacit knowledge, a “wiring 
of the brain” that allows us to do things that we are not fully conscious of. Hidalgo (2015) uses the 
term “personbyte” as a unit that measures this tacit knowledge and know-how that an individual 
possesses. Given that humans are finite, there is a limit to the amount of knowledge an individual can 
accumulate. In terms of production, many products require more than one personbyte to be produced. 
Therefore, various, different personbytes need to be combined to produce a certain product. The 
ability to create these networks of knowledge and know-how, the accumulation of personbytes, is 
defined as social capital (Hidalgo, 2015). Therefore, while human capital is the knowledge and know-
how embodied in individuals, social capital is the ability of society to connect and form networks of 




knowledge and know-how (Hidalgo, 2015). However, the ability to form these networks hinges on the 
availability of communication and transportation technologies, personal values, standards and trust 
which cannot be traded or transferred easily across borders (Hidalgo, 2015).  
Therefore, while tools and codified knowledge, for example, can be shared globally through transport 
networks and communication channels, collective know-how, the ability to form finance networks, 
logistic networks and knowledge networks, are difficult to trade and share (Hausmann et al., 2009). It 
is this difficulty in transferral that can hinder growth. According to Hausmann (2016), know-how grows 
through specialisation by individuals. Since individuals have limited capacity in the amount of 
knowledge they can acquire, for know-how to expand, individuals within a society must become more 
specialised in a piece of knowledge that makes up the whole (Hausmann, 2016). For example, Adam 
Smith’s division of labour theory argued that through the specialisation of tasks, workers would be 
able to increase their individual efficiency and collectively, their output. Similarly, Hausmann (2016) 
and Hidalgo (2015) argue that a specialisation of know-how and the increase in the units of different 
personbytes within a country, coupled with the co-operation of individuals and expansion of networks, 
allows for the production of increasingly complex products as specialised parts of knowledge 
(personbytes) contribute to overall output. Development is the accumulation and increasing 
acquisition of know-how (human capital), which is co-ordinated, combined and recombined (social 
capital) to produce more complex goods.  
As an example, the production process to make a dress requires a design, the sourcing of fabric and 
a dressmaker to cut and sew the dress. Thereafter, the dress needs to be packaged, branded, 
marketed and distributed (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014). It is unlikely that the knowledge and 
capabilities needed for each stage of the production process is held by one individual, or personbyte, 
but rather, knowledge of these various processes will be held by different people in a firm or a market. 
Furthermore, this operation will need to be financed and activities coordinated. This entire operation 
requires social capital of know-how (knowledge of who holds specified knowledge for each stage of 
the process) and know-where (knowing the location of these individuals that hold this knowledge) 
(Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014). It is the interaction of this knowledge through organisations and 
markets that allow for output of production. This highlights the point that development occurs when 
know-how across society is accumulated. 
 
3.2 Economic Complexity 
 
Economic Complexity therefore relates to the amount of productive knowledge or capabilities existent 
in a country. The more capabilities (personbytes) a society possesses, the more possibilities exist for 
combining these capabilities which leads to increasingly diversified and complex outputs (Bhorat et 




al., 2019). The amount of embedded knowledge or know-how can be determined by the diversity and 
ubiquity of the products produced in a particular country. Countries that contain many different 
personbytes are able to produce a wide variety of products. Furthermore, products that require a large 
volume of knowledge, combining different personbytes, are only produced in countries where that 
combination of knowledge exists. Therefore, diversity is expressed through the number of diverse and 
distinct products a country produces while ubiquity relates to how many other countries are able to 
produce a particular product. Formally, diversity is defined as: 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑘𝑐,0 = ∑𝑀𝑐𝑝
𝑝
 
And ubiquity is defined as: 
  
𝑈𝑏𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑘𝑝,0 = ∑𝑀𝑐𝑝
𝑐
 
Source: (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014) 
Where 𝑀𝑐𝑝 is defined as a matrix that is 1 if a country 𝑐 produces product 𝑝, and 0 if it does not. The 
diversity and ubiquity of a country is measured by summing the rows and columns of the matrix. 
Figure 2 highlights this notion of diversity and ubiquity. In this example, diversity accounts for the total 
number of products a country is connected to. This equals the number of links within a country's 
network. Therefore, the diversity (kc,0) of Denmark is 5 since it is able to produce serums and 
vaccines, beer, dishwashing machines, potatoes and t-shirts. The diversity of Egypt is 3 since it only 
produces 3 out of the 5 products and Haiti’s diversity is 1 respectively. Ubiquity (kp, 0) is measured 
by the number of countries that a product is related to. This then equals the number of links that 
products have in its network. In this example, the ubiquity of t-shirts is 3 since every country is able 
to produce this good; potatoes and dishwashing machines are 2 since these products are only 
produced by Egypt and Denmark; and beer, serums and vaccines have a ubiquity of 1 since Denmark 
is the only country that produces and exports these goods.  




Figure 2. Diversity and Ubiquity  
Source: (Authors own using Comtrade data) 
To further highlight this notion of diversity, ubiquity and ultimately economic complexity which is 
related to the embedded knowledge within a country, Hausmann, Hidalgo et al. (2014) use the 
analogy of a game of scrabble (Figure 3). In scrabble, each letter is used to create a word. In this 
analogy, each letter represents a capability a country possesses, and words represent the products 
that these capabilities, when combined, are able to produce. Therefore, depending on what fraction 
of the alphabet a player (country) holds will determine how many words a player can make. Players 
that hold more letters will be able to produce more words while players with less letters are limited in 
the number of words they can make. For example, in Figure 3, player 1 possesses 2 capabilities and 
consequently is only able to produce 2 words. Player 3 on the other hand, possesses 4 letters and is 
able to produce 10 words.  The number of words a player makes is related to the diversity of a 
country’s export basket. Those countries with less capabilities (player 1) are limited in the diversity of 
goods (number of words) produced while countries with an abundance of capabilities (player 3) are 









Figure 3. Scrabble Analogy 
 
Source: (Authors own) 
Furthermore, in the game of scrabble, longer words tend to be harder to make compared to short 
words which are more common. This relates to the ubiquity of the products a country produces. It is 
clear in this analogy that longer words (products) also require more letters (capabilities). Ubiquitous 
products are those that require fewer capabilities and therefore, many countries are able to produce 
these goods. For example, the words “a” and “at” are produced by all 3 players and would therefore 
be categorised as ubiquitous words. Non-ubiquitous products, likened to longer words, tend to require 
a large variety of capabilities which not everyone possesses. The words “let,” “ale,” “late,” “tale” and 
“teal” are only produced by player 3 and are categorised as being non-ubiquitous words. Therefore, 
more letters are needed to create longer words just as an increase in capabilities allows for both the 
diversification of products produced and the potential for non-ubiquity in a country’s product mix.  
However, the issue of scarcity presents a problem especially when considering the production of 
natural resources such as oil and diamonds. Non-ubiquitous goods can include goods such as 
airplanes, which are high in technological content and difficult to produce, but can also include goods 
such as diamonds and crude petroleum which are natural resources and consequently, naturally non-
ubiquitous (Gala et al., 2018). This is evident when comparing the ubiquity of countries in Table 1. 
Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Qatar and Angola are all exporters of oil and are well-endowed with this natural 
resource. Furthermore, Botswana produces and exports rough diamonds which are naturally non-
ubiquitous. These countries’ levels of ubiquity are similar to those of Sweden and Japan, highly 
developed countries with complex economies, able to produce many non-ubiquitous products such 
as medicaments (Sweden) and image processing medical devices (Japan). However, despite having 




similar levels of ubiquity, these countries’ economies are vastly different in terms overall complexity. 
Therefore, to counter this measurement issue, and control for scarce natural resources, the ubiquity 
of a certain product in a given country is compared with the diversity of exports in countries that 
produce and export that same product. In Table 1, these discrepancies are clear. While these selected 
countries may have similar levels of ubiquity, their levels of diversity diverge significantly, especially 
when comparing Japan and Sweden to Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Botswana, Qatar and Angola. 
Therefore, while all the countries in Table 1 have similar levels of ubiquity, the level of diversity differs 
significantly which ultimately impacts on a countries level of economic complexity. Japan and Sweden 
have complex economies given their ability to produce both diverse and non-ubiquitous products.   
Table 1. ECI of Selected Countries According to their Diversity and Ubiquity Measures 
Country Diversity Ubiquity ECI 
Countries with High Levels of Complexity    
Japan 346 18.59 2.26 
Sweden 284 18.66 1.76 
Oil and Natural Resource Rich Countries    
Saudi Arabia 70 19.30 0.72 
Nigeria 54 19.66 -1.44 
Botswana 30 20.07 -0.01 
Qatar 26 19.73 0.30 
Angola 12 20.67 -1.38 
Source: (Own calculations using Comtrade data) 
To generate a more accurate measure of the capabilities’ existent in a country or the capabilities 
required to produce a certain product, the Method of Reflections is used which uses the diversity and 
ubiquity measures iteratively to improve the estimate of productive knowledge and complexity within 
a country. This process continues until convergence where quantitative measures for complexity, both 
the economic complexity index (ECI) and product complexity index (PCI) are generated. 








∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝 ∙ 𝑘𝑐,𝑁−1𝑐       (2) 
where 𝑀𝑐𝑝 = 1 if 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑝 ≥ 1 and N corresponds to the number of iterations. 
Equation (2) is then inserted into equation (1) to obtain 


















And then is re-written as: 









When 𝑘𝑐, 𝑁 = 𝑘𝑐, 𝑁−2 = 1, the equation is satisfied. At this point, this corresponds to the eigenvector 
of 𝑀𝑐𝑐′ associated with the largest eigenvalue. Since this eigenvector is a vector of ones, it does not 
provide informative information. Therefore, one looks for the eigenvector which is associated with the 
second largest eigenvalue. This eigenvector captures the second largest amount of variance in the 
system and is the measure of the ECI which is defined as:  
𝐸𝐶𝐼 =
?⃗? − ⟨?⃗? ⟩
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣(?⃗? )
 
Where 〈 〉  is an average, 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣 is the standard deviation and, 
?⃗? = 𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑀𝑐𝑐′ 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  
Source: (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014) 
Therefore, the economic complexity of a country and ultimately, the embedded knowledge and 
capabilities within, can be determined by the complexity of products exported. Ubiquity and diversity 
are the two building blocks which inform the economic complexity of a country’s export basket (Gala 
et al., 2018). An export basket consisting of diverse, complex, rare and non-ubiquitous goods is 
indicative of a country with a sophisticated productive structure and vice versa.  
 
3.3. The Economic Complexity Index as a Measure for Growth 
 
Using the economic complexity methodology, Hidalgo et al. (2009) created the economic complexity 
index using international trade data to measure the economic complexity existent in different country 




economies. The economic complexity methodology provides information about a countries’ industrial 
structure and productive capabilities through relative comparisons of country export baskets (Hidalgo, 
et al., 2009). Hidalgo et al. (2009) found that over time as countries grow and develop, the products 
produced diversify and tend to become more complex. They found that developed economies tend to 
export a wide range of products whilst developing countries tend to export a limited few (Hausmann 
and Chauvin, 2015). Furthermore, the products exported by developed economies are generally more 
complex and less ubiquitous compared to developing countries’ products which tend to be relatively 
simple and ubiquitous. It could be extrapolated therefore, that cross-country levels of economic 
complexity and therefore productive knowledge, is positively correlated with economic development 
(Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). This is shown in Figure 4 which utilises countries’ relative levels of 
economic complexity (for 2017) and plots these as a function of these countries’ level of GDP per 
capita (for 2018). The positive correlation between economic complexity and GDP is clearly shown.  
Figure 4. Economic Complexity and GDP Growth 
 
Source: (Own calculations using Comtrade data) 
It is not increased productivity in the production of one product that drives growth but rather, increased 
complexity which is gained through increased productive knowledge within a country, measured 
through the product mix a country produces (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014). Countries that possess 
more knowledge, through individuals and organisations, have the potential to produce more diverse 
products (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014). Similarly, products that are complex and require large 
volumes of knowledge to be produced, can only be produced in countries where that knowledge is 
existent. The accumulation of productive knowledge builds economic complexity as activities shift 




from those that are low in complexity (low productivity) towards activities which are more complex 
(high productivity). Through the process of structural transformation, countries accumulate productive 
capabilities and diversify into increasingly complex products becoming more complex in the process 
(Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014; Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2011). Since higher levels of complexity 
are positively correlated with higher levels of development, for a country to grow in economic 
complexity and development, the accumulation of productive capabilities is needed. 
Therefore, according to Hausmann, Hidalgo et al. (2014), the ECI is closely linked to the level of a 
country’s development and is able to predict its future economic growth. Italian economists Cristelli, 
Tacchella and Pietronero (2015) however, posit that while the economic complexity methodology has 
provided a more robust, scientific framework for economic predictions, it is still unable to provide 
economic predictions for a dynamic and evolutionary system (Cristelli et al., 2015). Their approach 
builds on the economic complexity methodology, the idea that a country’s export basket is able to 
discount and reflect (mostly) the embedded knowledge encoded within the intangible assets in an 
economy. However, they argue that regression-based approaches are unable to predict and account 
for the heterogenous dynamics of country growth. To counter this issue, Cristelli at al. (2015) 
introduced non-monetary metrics to assess country competitiveness by quantifying the intangible 
assets to measure the strength and evolution of a country’s economic system and consequently, the 
country’s level of fitness. Based on these metrics and comparisons between countries, they were able 
to generate the fitness-income plane, which highlights the heterogenous evolutionary dynamics 
between countries. Countries are then plotted on this plane according to their ‘fitness.’ Cristelli et al. 
(2015) argue that depending on where countries are placed on the fitness-income plane can 
determine its potential for economic growth. For example, countries situated in the ‘laminar’ zone tend 
to be more resilient to external shocks and consequently more predictable in terms of economic 
growth. Alternatively, countries generally reliant on raw material exports or plagued by civil war tend 
to be found in the chaotic regions of the income/fitness plane with low levels of predictability for future 
growth (Cristelli et al., 2015). The authors argue that one-dimensional, linear indicators are insufficient 
to predict economic growth given the heterogeneous dynamics of countries. Instead, GDP-measures 
need to be complemented with non-monetary driven indicators in order to conceptualise the economic 
dynamics related to country evolution on a multi-dimensional scale, as in the case of the fitness-
income plane, to better predict a country’s future economic performance (Cristelli et al., 2015).  
Whilst these are valid points, especially with respect to the inability to capture the heterogenous and 
evolutionary dynamics of countries through time, the conclusion that standard regression analysis 
cannot explain the relationship between two variables is flawed. Regression is the dominant technique 
used by scholars of economic growth to validate hypotheses on the effect of certain variables 
(Stojkoski and Kocarev, 2017). Furthermore, while the economic complexity analysis provides a 
robust measure for assessing a country’s current productive structure and potential for future 




diversification, these findings should always be analysed within the context of a particular country and 
complemented with other relevant data (both qualitative and quantitative). The complexity analytics 
provide visual representations of a country’s productive structure through the creation of the product 
space and hence, whilst the methodology cannot account for the heterogenous dynamics of countries, 
it provides a useful tool for analysis of a country’s productive structure and capabilities, allowing for 
further analysis of potential paths for structural transformation and diversification based on existing 
capabilities.  
 
Chapter 4. The Product Space 
 
4.1. The Product Space and Structural Transformation 
 
Expanding the amount of productive knowledge and capabilities in order to diversify into new and 
increasingly complex activities gives rise to the ‘chicken and egg’ conundrum (Hausmann, Hidalgo, 
Bustos et al., 2011). If capabilities needed for a product or more broadly, an industry, are not present 
in a country, these products or industries will not exist. However, if these industries do not exist, the 
accumulation of knowledge needed for these industries is unlikely to materialise as there is no existing 
industry or product to drive demand, and hence no incentive to accumulate these productive 
capabilities. This is pronounced when productive capabilities required, differ significantly from those 
capabilities already present and embedded within a country’s existing productive structure. Hidalgo, 
Klinger, Barbase and Hausmann (2007) and Hausmann, Hidalgo et al. (2014), argue that new 
capabilities are more easily acquired if they are similar to those that already exist. Countries should 
therefore move towards producing products that are ‘related’ or ‘proximate’ in terms of the productive 
knowledge required (Hidalgo et al., 2007) thus allowing for the overlapping of existing capabilities and 
knowledge that would facilitate diversification. This idea posits that countries will move into industries 
and the production of products that are similar to ones that already exist. For example, it is easier to 
shift into the production of blouses from shirts, than to shift from producing shirts to jet engines (Bhorat 
et al., 2019) as the existing capabilities embedded in the economy required to produce shirts are 
similar to those needed to produce blouses as opposed to jet engines. Within this complexity 
framework, Hidalgo et al. (2007) and Hausmann and Klinger (2006) developed a product space to 
explore this hypothesis that learning externalities are involved in the production process.  
The product space is a network that allows for the visualisation of all products exported by countries 
(Figure 5). A limitation of the product space analysis is that it assumes factors of production are limited 
within national borders and that goods are wholly produced in a given economy (Hickson, 2017). This 
neglects the advent of global supply chains and the increasing fragmentation of production across 




borders that has accompanied the rise in globalisation. Productive capabilities used in the production 
of intermediate goods therefore may not be directly measured (Hickson, 2017). Notwithstanding these 
limitations, generating accurate data to account for the intermediate production activities would prove 
challenging. Consequently, while the product space cannot account for the entire production process, 
it still provides a superior predictor of economic growth and sound illustrative understanding of the 
path-dependent trajectory of economic growth.  
To map the product space, a measure of proximity is used to calculate the distance between various 
pairs of products that are likely to be co-exported by a country. Products that are frequently co-
exported are strongly connected and will lie closer to each other in the product space. This finding is 
derived from the assumption that should two products share a large portion of required capabilities, a 
country exporting the one product will likely export the other (Bhorat et al., 2019). Furthermore, if two 
products require very different capabilities, they will lie further away from each other in the product 
space and it is unlikely that they will be co-exported. The collection of these proximities between 
products creates a network called the product space which can be used to study the productive 
structures of countries.  
The product space is made up of a core and periphery. The periphery of a country’s product space 
tends to be dominated by primary products that are less connected and sparsely populated compared 
to the core of the product space which typically comprises manufactured products which are more 
complex. Interestingly, the spread of EGs across the product space is similar to the spread of all 
traded products. Complex EGs such as “Other engines and motors” are located in the core of the 
product space while relatively simple EGs such as “Twine and ropes of baste fibres”, are located in 
the periphery of the product space (Mealy and Teytelboym, 2018) Graphically, nodes represent the 
different products that a country produces, and the size of the nodes illustrate the product share of 
total exports for a particular country. Their respective colours relate to their product grouping. For 
example, in Figure 5, the dark blue nodes represent “Ships” as indicated by the product key. These 
product nodes in the product space are connected by various linkages which illustrate the proximity 
between two connected products. The shorter and broader the connections, the closer the products 
are in proximity to one another. Close proximity is indicative of products that share similar capabilities 
for production (Hausman, Hidalgo et al., 2014). It makes sense for a country to move towards 
producing a product close to an existing product node given the similarity in capabilities required, as 
opposed to choosing a product node far away. For example, in Figure 5, the coloured nodes for 
“Textiles and Fabric” are in close proximity to the coloured nodes for “Garments” while “Textiles and 
Fabrics” are on the opposite side of the product space to the product nodes representing “Chemicals 
and Health.” This is logical since the capabilities required for producing textiles and fabric are likely 
be similar to those needed for producing garments, as opposed to those capabilities needed for 
producing chemicals and health products. Similarly, as illustrated below, groups of products requiring 




a similar set of capabilities tend to form closely connected clusters which in turn, tend to exhibit similar 
levels of complexity (Hausman, Hidalgo et al., 2014). For instance, those products which form the 
“Chemicals, Machinery and Electronic” communities tend to be far more complex and located towards 
the ‘core’ of the product space compared to those products in the “Oil” or “Tropical Agriculture” 
communities which tend to be less complex and situated in the periphery of the product space 
(Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014). This once again highlights the logic that countries will diversify into 
producing products that require capabilities that are already pre-existent within that country. 
Therefore, the structure of the product space shows that development and the process of 
accumulating productive knowledge is not random but rather, path dependant and guided by a 
country’s existing capabilities and embedded knowledge.  
Figure 5. The Product Space 
 
 
Notes: Product groupings or clusters are represented by the following colours: Textiles & Furniture (light green); 
Vegetables, Foodstuffs & Wood (yellow); Stone & Glass (light brown); Minerals (dark brown); Metals (red); Chemicals & 
Plastics (light purple); Transport Vehicles (dark purple); Machinery (blue); Electronics (turquoise); and Other (dark blue) 
Source: (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014) 
The product space is important because it affects how countries are able to diversify and grow. For 
instance, a country’s starting point in the product space can predict the products and industries it is 




likely to develop in the future, since countries are more likely to move into producing products nearby, 
given the pre-existing capabilities that are similar to those required (Hausmann and Chauvin, 2015). 
Hidalgo et al. (2007) found that when looking at the product space over time for various countries, 
new export products would emerge close to existing products (Hidalgo et al., 2007). For example, 
Germany’s existing expertise in high-precision machining allowed them to move into the production 
of wind turbines given the overlap in knowledge required to produce both goods (Fankhauser et al., 
2013). This supports the empirical finding that production and the process of growth and diversification 
is linked to learning, it does not follow a random path but is incremental and to a certain degree, 
predictive. This implies that future production of a country is influenced by the products a country 
currently produces (Bhorat et al., 2019).  
To explore this hypothesis that the development of production involves learning externalities and that 
new products generally emerge close to existing products in the product space, two measures, 
Distance and Opportunity Gain were developed to analyse opportunities for structural transformation 
in the product space (Hausmann and Klinger, 2006; Hidalgo et al., 2007). Every two products in the 
product space have a globally defined proximity between them (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014). This 
proximity measure shows the probability of the two products being co-exported. Since products that 
are co-exported tend to be similar, the proximity between a pair of co-exported products will be short. 
For a pair of products that are unlikely to be co-exported given that they are very different, the 
proximity between this unlikely pair will be far. This measure between two pairs of products is called 
“Distance.” Distance is defined as the sum of all proximities that connect a new good, p, to all the 
other products that a country, c, is not currently exporting (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 2014). Distance 
is therefore calculated by summing the proximities of all other products that a country, c, is not yet 
exporting (RCA<1), to good p and dividing that by the number of products that country c is not yet 
exporting (Hausmann and Chauvin, 2015).  
Formally,  
𝑑𝑐𝑝 =




Simply put, Distance is the weighted average of products connected to good p that a country, c, is not 
yet exporting.  
In addition, to formalise the idea that the development of new and more complex products leads to 
the development of future opportunities for diversification, a measure of “Opportunity Value” and 
“Opportunity Gain” is developed. Given that developed countries in general, tend to have higher levels 
of income which is positively correlated to increasingly complex products and faster growth, it is 




important to determine the complexity of products in the product space. The opportunities for future 
growth and diversification will differ for countries depending on the products it currently exports. While 
some countries are only connected to a few relatively simple and poorly connected products, others 
are connected to multiple, highly complex goods (Hausman, Hidalgo et al., 2014). A country’s starting 
point in the product space, therefore, will influence the value of its future opportunities. The 
Opportunity Value of an unexploited product for a country is calculated by adding the level of 
complexity of those products that are not currently exported by how close these products are to those 
products which a country currently exports (Hausman, Hidalgo et al., 2014). Mathematically, this is 
shown by: 
𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑐 = ∑(1 − 𝑑𝑐𝑝 ′)(1 − 𝑀𝑐𝑝 ′)𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑝 ′
𝑝 ′
 
Where p ‘  refers to the Product Complexity Index (PCI) of the product. The term 1 − 𝑀𝑐𝑝 ′ ensures that 
only the products that a country is currently not producing are counted (Hausmann, Hidalgo et al., 
2014). A higher Opportunity Value is indicative of being close to more products and/or more complex 
products (Hausman, Hidalgo et al., 2014). Opportunity Value is used to calculate the potential gain, 
Opportunity Gain, a country, c, would acquire should it move into producing a new product. 
Opportunity Gain is calculated as the change in Opportunity Value when a new product is developed 
(RCA>1). Therefore, the measure of Opportunity Gain quantifies the possible opportunities a new 
product introduces should it be developed. Formally, Opportunity Gain can be written as: 
𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐 = ∑(
∅𝑝𝑝 ′
∑ ∅𝑝𝑝 ′𝑝
 (1 − 𝑀𝑐𝑝  ′)𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑝 ′ − (1 − 𝑑𝑐𝑝𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑝))
𝑝 ′
 
The Opportunity Value then summarises the value of a country’s position in the product space; how 
far or near it is from complex products (Hausmann and Chauvin, 2015). If the development of RCA 
for a new product opens up paths for future diversification, decreasing the distance to other strategic 
products, it is a strategically valuable product. RCA is based on the definition by Balassa (1965) where 
a country exports a product with a revealed comparative advantage (RCA>1) if the ratio of exports for 
that product to the country’s total exports is greater than the share of that products global exports in 
total global trade (Atlas, 2019a). Furthermore, products that are connected to multiple products in the 
product space prove critical in a country’s long-term diversification process. Therefore, the measure 
of Opportunity Gain captures the potential of a new product and how it can improve a country’s 
position in the product space (Hausmann and Chauvin, 2015). The product space is therefore a 
graphical representation of the connectedness between products, visualising the paths for 
diversification through mapping out distance and proximities between products. 




Structural transformation in the product space occurs when countries move away from producing 
simple products at the periphery, towards increasingly complex products at the core. However, a 
country with a productive structure dominated by many connected products in the core of its product 
space is in a better position to diversify into new products since products in the core are more closely 
connected to other products and require similar productive capabilities. Economic growth for these 
countries is also promising since these products tend to be more complex. On the other hand, 
countries whose productive structures are more sparsely populated and where products exist 
predominantly in the periphery, will find it more difficult to diversify towards products closer to the core 
given that their productive capabilities lie further away from these core products. This means that 
diversification is limited for these countries. Therefore, countries that produce products in close 
proximity in the product space tend to find diversification easier than those countries that produce 
products that are isolated and located in the periphery of the product space (Hausmann and Chauvin, 
2015).   
 
4.2.  South Africa’s Structural Transformation and the Product Space 
 
Structural change, the movement of capital and labour into activities and sectors with higher 
productivity, is key to growing more complex and sophisticated activities and integrating into the global 
economy (Bell et al., 2018). A productive structure which is more complex enables countries to 
partake in high-productivity activities leading to faster growth and development (Felipe et al., 2012). 
However, South Africa has struggled to transform its economy since the onset of democracy and 
participation in the global economy in 1994. While the economy has grown, this growth has been slow 
and unbalanced across the various sectors. The persistence of inequality and unemployment 
prevents sustainable economic growth and has led to a stagnation of the economy with economic 
growth failing to exceed 2% since 2008 (Jeffrey, 2016). In comparison to other upper-middle income 
countries, South Africa has performed poorly. While most of these countries’ average annual GDP 
growth has exceeded 4% over the period of 1995 to 2018, as shown in Figure 6, South Africa’s 










Figure 6. Average GDP Growth for selected Upper-Middle Income Countries 1995-2018 
 
Source: (World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2019) 
Furthermore, while South Africa is characterised as an upper-middle income country, it has not 
managed to reach the level of high-income status that other previously categorised middle-income 
countries, such as Hong Kong SAR (China), Greece, Japan, Ireland, Israel, Portugal, Spain, Taiwan, 
Singapore and the Republic of Korea, have. (Bhorat et al., 2014).  
Overall, in upper-middle income countries, value-add from industry has spurred GDP growth over the 
period of 1995-2018. In countries such as Turkey and Malaysia, industry has grown with GDP. This 
has not been the case for South Africa or Brazil. For both countries, manufacturing, a sub-set of 
industry, has grown slower than GDP (Bell et al., 2018). As seen in Figure 7, in South Africa (as with 
Brazil and Indonesia), manufactured exports make up a relatively small share of total merchandise 
exports at only 47.1% in 2017. However, while Indonesia’s manufactured exports share is also low 
(43.6%), there has been substantial growth in the country’s manufacturing’s share of value-added 
growth over the 1995 to 2017 period (4.6%), unlike that of South Africa (2.2%) and Brazil (0.5%). 
Overall, the percentage share of industry’s value-add to annual growth for South Africa over the period 
of 1995-2017 has been low compared to other upper-middle income countries 
 




Figure 7. Economic Indicators of selected Upper-Middle Income Countries 
 
Source: (World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2019)2 
South Africa, along with other middle-income countries such as Brazil, Turkey and the Philippines, 
has been unable to significantly increase its per capita growth rates. The characteristics of South 
Africa’s stagnant growth are indicative of a long-run growth trap. A growth trap in middle-income 
countries is characterised by a period of high economic growth followed by a pattern of low growth 
and productivity (Bhorat et al., 2014). Historically, middle-income countries have fallen into this trap 
through a general process. Imported technology stimulates a shift in labour from low productivity to 
high productivity sectors. This increases growth and results in an increase in per capita GDP. These 
imported technologies tend to be employed in sectors which are labour-intensive, consequently 
absorbing underemployed or unemployed labour. This continues until productivity growth from 
technological catch-up eventually plateaus as it is exhausted, wages rise and exports which are 
labour-intensive become less competitive in international markets as their prices increase. At this 
point, the movement of labour from low productivity activities to higher productivity activities does not 
produce further growth as the gains from importing technologies diminishes (Bhorat et al., 2014). In 
South Africa, there are various factors which have led to this cycle of low growth. These factors include 
 
2 No manufacturing, value-added (annual % growth) data was available for China 




an over-dependence on resource-led export growth, following a capital-intensive industrialisation 
path, a lack of investment, reliance on state infrastructure to drive domestic growth, and a growth path 
focused on sectors that lack employment-intensity (Bhorat et al., 2014).   
From a policy perspective, legacies of the Apartheid period still undermine growth today. The 
exploitation of cheap labour by the Apartheid government in the mining and agricultural sectors 
beyond the point of productive economic gains, and the failure to move the labour force into higher 
productive sectors, has created a structural blockage for economic growth in present times (Bhorat et 
al., 2014). Racial politics during the Apartheid era prevented the up-skilling of labour and education 
of the majority of South Africa’s workforce which has caused structural challenges for economic 
growth in the present day as the necessary skills needed for growth are scarce. A lack of savings due 
to the low employment rate, coupled with low fixed investment rates prevents further investment into 
the economy and a take-off of growth (Bhorat et al., 2014). Furthermore, low levels of industrial 
competition as a result of a concentration in industry as well as high barriers to entry for new firms, 
prevent further investment to help diversify South Africa’s economy. For example, in the 
manufacturing sector, 70% of the market share was held by five of the largest firms in 22 sub-sectors 
of the economy in South Africa (Mhlanga, 2018). In the energy, communication technologies, financial 
services, agro-processing and food sectors, one firm in each of these sectors accounts for up to 45% 
of the market share (Mhlanga, 2018). This concentration prevents competition within sectors and 
crowds out investment opportunities. Moreover, volatile labour relations, political uncertainty and a 
lack of skills in the market raise the cost and risk of doing business in South Africa. Therefore, while 
the real returns to capital in South Africa provide highly favourable gains, these structural barriers and 
perceived political risks tend to outweigh the favourable investment returns available (Bhorat et 
al.,2014).  
Technological change, innovation and the development of economies of scale are required for a 
country to spur economic growth, move up the value chain and compete globally in goods, ideas and 
money (Bhorat et al., 2014). However, in South Africa, there has been a lack of innovation and 
technological development. This can be assessed by looking at South Africa’s spending on Research 
and Development (R&D), the number of patents it holds, as well as its Technology Balance of 
Payments (TBP). In South Africa, Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of global R&D 
expenditure has decreased from 0.42% in 2007/2008 to 0.28% in 2013/2014 (NACI, 2014). 
Furthermore, according to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), this R&D spending has been 
concentrated in the traditional sectors of South Africa’s economy such as mining, minerals and finance 
(World Bank, 2018). Where South Africa once held only a little less patents than the total number of 
patents of all the other BRIC countries combined, comprising 49% of the BRICS share, in 2011, South 
African patents comprised 13% of the BRICS total share (Kaplan, 2014). This lack of innovation is 
further pronounced when assessing the performance of South Africa’s TBP. The TBP comprises both 




the payments by nationals to foreigners for the licensing rights to acquire technology, as well as the 
receipts from foreigners for the licensing of technology (Kaplan, 2014). Licensing receipts prove to be 
a good indicator of a country’s technological strength and innovative activities at the global frontier 
(Kaplan, 2014). However, in South Africa, payments for technology have risen exponentially while 
technology receipts have remained stagnant (Kaplan, 2018). While South Africa’s annual royalties 
and licence fee receipts averaged $58 million between 1991 and 1995, more than any of its BRIC 
peers, between 2001 and 2010 this trend reversed.  Between 2001 and 2010, South Africa’s 
technology receipts averaged $42 million compared to India at $102 million, Brazil at $220 million, 
Russia at $293 million and China at $291 million (Kaplan, 2014). Overall, South Africa has performed 
poorly in terms of innovation and technological development which is evidenced by South Africa’s 
position in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index which stood at 61 out of 137 
countries in 2017/18, a significant decrease compared to its position of 47 in 2016/17 (Schwab, 2018).  
A lack of innovation and stagnant growth is further evidenced when looking at South Africa’s exports. 
Between 2007 and 2012, 90% of South Africa’s export growth was attributed to raw materials and 
lightly beneficiated materials with high technology exports comprising only 4.28% of South Africa’s 
exports compared to India’s share of 7.2% and Russia’s of 8.85% (Kaplan, 2018; Kaplan, 2014). The 
broad industry groups that dominate South Africa’s manufacturing output are metals, metal products, 
machinery and equipment; petroleum products, chemicals, rubber and plastics; and food, beverages 
and tobacco (Bell et al., 2018). These industry groups are led by the resource-based sectors of 
chemicals and basic metals. This dominance has not changed much since 1995 and clearly shows a 
strong path dependency effect. Furthermore, there has been a regression since 1995 away from more 
sophisticated and diversified manufacturing activities towards resource-based sectors led by refined 
petroleum products, basic iron and steel, and coke (Bell et al., 2018). 
While food products, motor vehicles and machinery and equipment have all experienced growth, there 
has been a lack of growth in terms of expanded knowledge and capabilities. For example, in the motor 
vehicle sector, while value-added growth has increased, this has largely been a result of the sustained 
industrial policy through the Automotive Production and Development Programme (APDP) (2013-
2020) and Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) (1995-2012). While this support has 
allowed for value-added growth, the industry still runs a trade deficit with local content declining as 
South Africa fails to develop the capabilities of more sophisticated auto hubs that exist in Mexico and 
Thailand (Bell et al., 2018). Consequently, the design of these supporting policies allows for import 
rebates, favouring multinational vehicle exporters, and resulting in downstream import penetration for 
tier 2 and 3 producers (Bell et al., 2018). The machinery and equipment sector follows a similar 
narrative. While the machinery and equipment sector grew between 2003 and 2009, spurred by local 
and regional demand, the sector decreased in competitiveness internationally caused by an 
appreciated exchange rate, worsening the trade balance through increased import penetration in 




higher value, more complex activities (Bell et al., 2018). This exchange rate appreciation was partly 
due to the commodity boom which ultimately led to the hollowing out of higher value, diversified 
manufacturing activities (Bell et al., 2018).  
Despite the South African economy’s diversification into machinery and chemical products, overall, 
its productive structure is still dominated by commodities (Bhorat et al., 2019). This is largely attributed 
to the recent commodity price boom coupled with low global interest rates which led to large 
investments into the exploration and production of commodities (World Bank, 2015). In sub-Saharan 
Africa overall, the share of commodities in exports rose from 57% in the period 1990 to 1999 to 76% 
in the period between 2010 and 2014 (World Bank, 2015). This phenomenon, along with poor levels 
of growth in manufacturing across the continent, has created dependency and a lack of diversity in 
productive activities and exports (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2014). This is evident when comparing South 
Africa’s product space from 1995 to 2017 as shown in Figure 8 and 9. 




















Figure 9. South Africa’s Product Space 2017 
 
In 1995, South Africa’s export basket consisted mainly of products low in complexity, located mostly 
in the periphery of the product space and relatively isolated from other manufactured products towards 
the core. Minerals, stone and glass, chemical products, vegetable and foodstuff made up most of 
South Africa’s export basket in 1995. When comparing South Africa’s product space in 1995 with its 
product space in 2017, the composition has not changed much. While 7 new products were added to 
South Africa’s export basket3, there has been a lack of exploitation of linkages between sectors as 
seen by the absence of ‘clustering’ in the product space (Atlas, 2019b). For example, in South Africa’s 
product space for 2017, ‘cars’ (indicated by the purple node) are clearly evident, yet auto components 
are largely missing. Where mining exports are present, as they were in 1995, broad clustering of 
machinery and equipment are not evident. One would expect to see a clustering of products in South 
Africa’s product space for 2017 located where competitive products were in 1995 as knowledge 
spillovers and similarity in capabilities are transferred to new, related industries. However, this has 
not been the case and clearly shows South Africa’s failure to exploit potential linkages within the 
economy, expand potential growth paths, build on existing capabilities and structurally transform the 
economy. In fact, according to the Atlas of Economic Complexity (Atlas, 2019b), the South African 
economy has become less complex, worsening its Economic Complexity Index (ECI) ranking from 
60th place in 2007 to 64th place in 2017. 
 
3 These are products which were absent 15 years ago (RCA<0.5) but are now present today with an RCA>1 (Atlas, 
2019b). 




The manufacturing sector in particular, has experienced a decline in capital-intensity and value-add 
from industry since 2000 (Black et al., 2017). Sectors such as textiles, footwear and metals, which 
are labour-intensive, have also experienced a decline in their employment and value-add. In addition, 
while exports have increased at approximately 6% annually since 1990, capital-intensive 
manufacturing exports have declined (Black et al., 2017). Furthermore, what is not shown in the 
product space is that since 2001, South Africa’s economy has shifted away from the mining, 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors towards the service sector. This is evidenced not only by the 
service sectors value added (% GDP) of 61.4% in 2018 compared to that of manufacturing at 11.8% 
and agriculture at 2.2%, but also in terms of employment (World Bank Indicators, 2019). The service 
sector employment rate is 71.6% while manufacturing comprises 23.2% and agriculture 5.2% (World 
Bank Indicators, 2019). What is concerning, however, is that in this service sector in South Africa, 
many individuals work in the low-productive, informal sectors, thus making it challenging to measure 
growth as well as facilitate future growth since data is not available. Furthermore, the formal sectors 
within the service industry such as the finance sector, tend to be capital-intensive and require highly 
skilled workers which comprise a small percentage of South Africa’s population. Given that the 
majority of workers in South Africa are low-skilled workers, the growth of the service sector and 
contraction of the agriculture and manufacturing sectors has caused substantial job-losses for 
numerous workers in South Africa and created barriers to entry in the job-market (Bhorat et al., 2019) 
Furthermore, a lack of skilled labour and an inadequacy of education and training programs to equip 
individuals with the necessary skills, precludes these individuals from even participating in South 
Africa’s economy (Bhorat and Rooney, 2017). Service-led growth coupled with premature 
deindustrialisation does not provide a sustainable growth trajectory for South Africa. 
To address these challenges, South Africa’s Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) champions the 
labour-intensive manufacturing sector as a solution to achieve the goals of employment and growth, 
set out in the country’s National Development Plan (NDP), through the creation of jobs and 
subsequent economic growth (DTI, 2017). In general, fast-growing economies comprise of a broad 
and diverse manufacturing sector and it is well recognised that value-add from manufacturing leads 
to numerous multiplier and spillover effects through the upskilling of workers, embedded 
technological-intensity and an inclusive growth trajectory (DTI, 2017). Historically, manufacturing 
through industrialisation has been the key driver in creating sustained economic growth. To date, no 
country has been able to lift significant numbers of their population out of poverty without 
industrialising, nor transition from a middle to a high-income country in the absence of a vibrant 
manufacturing sector (DTI, 2017).  
However, the global context has changed with the dispersion of production and services across 
national boundaries intensifying global competition and changing how countries develop and 
structurally transform. In addition, traditional manufacturing is highly energy- and pollution-intensive 




and is unsustainable for the planet – it will therefore be inappropriate to attempt to emulate the 
traditional growth path of manufacturing-led structural transformation. It is clear that growth-enhancing 
structural transformation is not an automatic process as is evidenced by South Africa’s shift towards 
growth-reducing informal service activities. South Africa needs to pursue its own agenda and an 
industrialisation path that feeds off its pre-existing knowledge and strengths. This must be coupled 
with forward-thinking and anticipation of future global trends, to transform the economy through the 
modernisation of industry and the development of strategic sectors. 
Carlota Perez (2012), an economic historian who has studied economic problems spanning the past 
240 years and their specific patterns, argues that history does in fact repeat itself. There have been 
five technological revolutions which have occurred over the past 240 years with each revolution 
bringing in a new techno-economic and socio-institutional shift, redirecting innovation and creating 
potential to leap into future productivity (Perez, 2016). The first technological revolution was the 
Industrial Revolution in the 1770s, with the rise of factories, machines and canals which were the 
‘Internet’ of that era. The fifth and current revolution began in the 1970s with the age of computers 
and information technology. Perez (2012) argues that the world is on the cusp of another paradigm 
shift where smart, green growth will transform lifestyles and has the potential to incorporate millions 
into a more sustainable and equitable growth trajectory.  
In the current global climate, as in the 1930s, there is structural unemployment, growing inequality, 
social unrest, recessions and feeble growth (Perez, 2016). Perez (2012) argues that in a turning point, 
where these technological revolutions begin, government action is a critical feature spurring 
transformation. The global demand for green goods increased by 307% from 2001 to 2015 compared 
to the demand for total trade of 106% (TIPS, 2018). Furthermore, in OECD countries, average tariffs 
applied to imported EGs declined from 1.6% in 2003 to 0.8% in 2016 (OECD, 2019). In countries 
outside the OECD, tariffs on EGs remained significantly higher, yet also declined from 7.4% in 2003 
to 4.1% in 2016 (OECD, 2019). This positive growth in trade for green goods and the shift towards 
sustainable production presents an opportunity for South Africa to transform its industrial sectors and 
diversify its export base. However, to compete in this market, will require the identification of strategic 
green products and industries to develop, creating local demand and navigating opportunities for 
exports. Government will need to take action to redirect South Africa’s export-growth trajectory, 
capitalising on opportunities to transform and green the economy in order to structurally transform 
South Africa’s economy into one that is able to compete in the future and provide equitable growth 
and employment. Therefore, green products need to be identified and located within South Africa’s 
productive structure to determine what green industries provide the most potential for diversification 
and development given South Africa’s existing productive structure and embedded knowledge. 
 




Chapter 5. South Africa’s Green Product Space 
 
5.1. Defining “Green Products” 
 
Globally, there lacks a universal definition for what constitutes “environmental goods” (EGs). 
Disagreement over what constitutes an EG and the inadequacy of the Harmonised System (HS) to 
categorise EGs remains an obstacle for the development of a comprehensive list of EGs that countries 
can agree upon. The lack of consensus over a comprehensive list of EGs is attributed to the practical 
difficulties that emerge when trying to devise such a list. Steenblik (2005) points to these difficulties 
which include the lack of specificity of current classifications, such as the HS six-digit level where 
products can have multiple uses, some of which are environmental and some which are not. 
Furthermore, there are problems with goods being defined by their relative environmental 
performance in use given that technology is constantly improving, thus changing the relative 
performance of certain goods (Sauvage, 2014). The inclusion of both finished and intermediate 
products in EGs lists complicates matters further since their coverage differs by industry on the HS 
classification system. Therefore, certain finished products, such as wind-generating sets, have their 
own unique HS code while other intermediate products used in waste-treatment plants, for example, 
do not (Sauvage, 2014).  
Despite these limitations, there have been numerous attempts to draw up lists of EGs. The dominant 
method of identifying “green” products has been to categorise sectors according to their level of 
contribution towards protecting the environment. However, this approach tends to separate sectors 
into those that are ‘environmental’ and those which are ‘non-environmental’, disregarding the broader 
economic impacts. Moreover, a sector considered relatively benign in its environmental footprint may 
contribute to the greening of other activities. An example of this is the electricity distribution and control 
apparatus sectors (Fankhauser et al., 2013). These sectors, while not obviously “green” can 
contribute to smarter electricity grids and therefore, decreased energy consumption (Fankhauser et 
al., 2013). A lack of consensus and globally accepted list of “green products” makes it difficult to 
measure the production capabilities a country has for “green” exports.  
In the absence of an internationally agreed upon list of EGs, and since certain lists may exclude goods 
considered ‘environmental’ since they have not been included in the context of trade negotiations, for 
the purpose of this paper, “green goods” will be classified according to the OECD definition of EGs. 
The OECD defines environmental goods and services as those activities that limit, prevent, minimise, 
measure or correct environmental damage (OECD, 1999). This paper will combine three existing lists 
totalling 248 products (see Annex 1). This set of products, which was named the “CLEG” (Combined 
List of Environmental Goods) by the OECD, uses the 2007 HS classification at the six-digit level, 
dividing goods according to environmental themes or mediums as shown in Table 2.  




Table 2. Environmental themes and media in the CLEG 
Code Environmental theme or medium 
APC Air pollution control 
CRE Cleaner or more resource efficient technologies and products 
EPP Environmentally preferable products based on end use or disposal 
characteristics 
HEM Heat and energy management 
MON Environmental monitoring, analysis and 
assessment equipment 
 
NRP Natural resources protection 
NVA Noise and vibration abatement 
REP Renewable energy plant 
SWM Management of solid and hazardous waste and recycling systems 
SWR Clean up or remediation of soil and water 
WAT Waste water management and potable water treatment 
Source: (Sauvage, 2014) 
The data used to calculate various complexity measures used in this paper, however, is classified 
according to the 1992 HS classification. To circumnavigate this problem, given that certain HS codes 
in the 2007 classification may not align with those in the 1992 HS classification, a comparison was 
done between the CLEG list comprising of HS 2007 classifications and their respective HS 1992 
classifications. While no difference was found at the HS 4-digit level and therefore, no amendments 
were needed, at the HS 6-digit level, 17 products were categorised differently. Of these 17 products 
at the HS 6-digit 2007 classification, 13 products had correlating classifications at the HS 6-digit 1992 
classification. Therefore, 4 products at the 2007 HS 6-digit level were dropped to ensure the 
streamlining of this analysis. This then narrowed the CLEG list of 248 environmental goods down to 
244 goods given the overlaps which existed (See Annex 1). Using the 2007 version of the HS 
classification ensures that any data-availability concerns, given that not all these products were 
exported in 1992, are removed.   
The CLEG list, used by the OECD, combines the ‘Friends’ list (WTO, 2009) which comprises 154 
products; the APEC list (APEC, 2012) comprising 54 products; and a modified version of the PEGS 
list. The original version of the PEGS list includes numerous HS six-digit codes for cars and other 
road vehicles. Since these HS lines also include most plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and hybrid 
electric vehicles, which are classified as EGs, the modified PEGS list excludes those HS lines of 
vehicles that are not classified as EGs and only considers vehicles which use fuels other than diesel 
fuel or gasoline (only HS 8702.90 and HS 8703.90) (Sauvage, 2014). The OECD list includes goods 




and services that aid in the management of pollution and include products such as pipes, tubes, filters 
and chemicals which are used in wastewater and sewage treatment; machines for grinding, kneading 
and mixing used for solid waste recycling services; air compressors and pumps used to control air 
pollution; and equipment such as optical instruments, for measuring and monitoring the environment 
(Balineau and Melo, 2011). This list also includes products used in “Resource management” such as 
renewable energy equipment which includes lattice masts and towers for wind turbines, optical fibres 
and photosensitive devices used in the generation, concentration and intensification of solar power 
or equipment used for indoor air pollution control (Balineau and Melo, 2011). These goods have 
multiple end-uses and don’t always serve environmental purposes. The “greening” of an economy is 
not only through the introduction of end-products such as solar panels but also in becoming more 
energy efficient and decreasing waste in industry processes. For this reason, products that can be 
used to further these objectives should also be considered.  
This list of goods is merged with the UN Comtrade export data to allow for the analysis of country 
trade in green products over the 1995-2017 period. While this list is still unable to account for the 
environmental benefits of products, dual-use products, production processes of products, and the 
overall environmental trade flow of a product, it follows the definition of green goods as those activities 
that limit, prevent, minimise, measure or correct environmental damage (OECD, 1999). This list is not 
too comprehensive that it compromises the integrity of the definition of “environmental goods”; and it 
is not too limited that it only considers final, finished products, inhibiting the development of products 
that have potential for combatting climate change. It provides a good balance and overview of EGs 
forming the foundation from which this analysis will begin. Using the tools of the Economic Complexity 
framework, South Africa’s green product space will be developed to illustrate the linkages and 
potential avenues for growth in various industries and thereafter, frontier green products will be 
identified.  
 
5.2.  Creation of the Product Space: Description of the Data and Limitations 
 
The product space is created using international trade data from the United Nations database, 
Comtrade. Hidalgo et al. (2007), create the product space using product-level trade data at the 4-digit 
level of the HS (Harmonised System) comprising of 1241 product groups as well as the Standard 
Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) comprising 1033 product groups. In the creation of the product 
space, the SITC 4-digit level data published by the United Nations can be used or data at the HS 4-
digit classification level compiled by the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) can be used. While both sets of data provide export information at the product 
level for over 200 countries, the HS 4 data is more granular and disaggregated into 1240 different 




products compared to the SITC data which is only disaggregated into 774 different products 
(Hausmann and Chauvin, 2015). The advantage of the SITC data is that it encompasses a longer 
time period with data available from 1964 compared to HS 4 data which is only available from 1995. 
However, for the purpose of this paper, HS 4 data has been used to allow for greater granularity at 
the product level, allowing for greater specificity.  
There are limitations to this data which must be noted. First, the data encompasses exported goods 
and does not capture aggregate production. Therefore, productive knowledge used not only in the 
production of exported goods but also in non-traded goods or services within a country, cannot be 
captured using this data. However, there is evidence that a high ECI in goods is positively correlated 
to a high ECI in services (Bhorat, 2017). Therefore, analysing South Africa’s exports and product 
space does not account for all of the existing knowledge within the South African economy since only 
exported goods, which do not account for the whole economy, can be measured. However, since this 
paper aims to identify opportunities for South Africa to diversify its export and productive base, it 
makes sense to look at export data. Second, the data used does not include the export of services. 
With the rapid spread of globalisation, services are increasingly being traded across borders and 
comprise a key share of international trade accounting for 13.1% of global trade in 2018 (World Bank, 
2018). In South Africa, services already account for 67.5% of GDP with trade in services contributing 
8.1% to South Africa’s GDP (World Bank, 2018; World Factbook, 2018). Noting that there are no 
comprehensive service international databases on services available that can match those available 
for goods (Hausmann and Chauvin, 2015) and accepting that the service data available does not 
have the level of granularity that allows for disaggregation of services provided, needed to create the 
product space (Hausmann and Chauvin, 2015),  this data is still able to share insight into the potential 
for the diversification of South Africa’s green products. 
 
5.3.  Identifying South Africa’s Green Frontier Products  
 
To create South Africa’s green product space, the CLEG list of 248 products is used. However, since 
the product space is created using HS 4-digit level data, the 248 green products at the HS 6-digit level 
are grouped according to their categorisation under HS 4-digit groupings. Following this step, 106 
new groupings for green products emerge (see Annex 2). While HS 4-digit data is not as granular and 
disaggregated as HS 6-digit data, HS 4 products will allow for the mapping of the product space. 
However, prior to mapping South Africa’s green product space, South Africa’s green frontier products 
need to be identified.  
Frontier products are those which have the potential to increase the diversification and attractiveness 
of a country’s export mix while still lying close enough to current capabilities so as to be feasible 




(Hausmann & Chauvin, 2015). Frontier products must satisfy the following criteria: they must be more 
complex than the average complexity of products South Africa currently exports; they must be feasible 
given South Africa’s current productive knowledge; and they must have the potential to open up paths 
for further, future diversification and growth. Additionally, in the case of South Africa, these frontier 
green products should also allow for the potential of further job creation that is inclusive of low-skilled 
labour given the high rate of unemployment in South Africa and the desperate need for employment 
generation.  
To identify what green products South Africa can diversify toward, complexity analytics are used to 
identify South Africa’s frontier green products. To generate the various complexity variables such as 
the product complexity (PCI), Distance and Opportunity Gain (as developed by Hausmann, Hidalgo 
et al. (2014), the ecomplexity Stata package, which was developed by Sebastian Bustos and 
Muhammed Yildirm (2014), was used. Ideally, the path of diversification would follow those products 
that have the highest PCI, highest Opportunity Gain and the shortest Distance (Hausmann & Chauvin, 
2015). However, in reality, trade-offs exist, and it is unlikely that this mix would exist. Generally, 
products identified as having the highest PCI tend to be the furthest away in terms of Distance 
(Hausmann & Chauvin, 2015). Similarly, products identified as having the highest Opportunity Gain 
tend to be at greater distances away. The trade-off between Distance and Opportunity Gain as well 
as Distance and PCI can be seen below in Figure 10 and 11.  







Source: (Own calculations using Comtrade data) 











Source: (Own calculations using Comtrade data) 
For the purpose of this paper, data at both the HS 4-digit level and the HS 6-digit level is used. This 
is important since when running the “ecomplexity” command in Stata, distance is not measured since 
HS 6-digit level products belong to HS 4-digit groupings in the product space. Therefore, HS 4-digit 
data allows for distance to be measured, and hence the identification of green frontier products in the 
product space. Once these products have been identified, HS 6-digit data, belonging to these broader 
product groups at the HS 4-digit level, will provide greater detail into what specific products should be 
targeted for development and/or show potential for enhancing a country’s Opportunity Gain and future 
diversification potential. However, it must be noted that country level reporting at the HS 6-digit level 
is not always as reliable as reporting at the HS 4-digit level. Therefore, while the HS 6-digit level data 
is important to provide greater detail, it is not the gold standard which will be used (Hausmann, Hidalgo 
et al., 2014).  
Drawing on the methodology used by Hausmann and Chauvin (2015), four consecutive steps are 
followed to identify South Africa’s “green frontier products.” First, all “non-green” products are 
removed and only the 106 HS 4-digit level products which include the 248 HS 6-digit level “green” 
identified products remain. This leaves 106 HS 4-digit level products out of South Africa’s total of 1234 
HS 4-digit level products. Second, all green products with a PCI lower than South Africa’s average 
PCI (which is 0.96) for all its exports in 2017 are dropped to ensure that the products that remain are 
the ones with the potential to increase the complexity of South Africa’s export mix. From this step, an 
additional 13 HS 4-digit level products are eliminated leaving 93 HS 4-digit level green products. Third, 
Distance is used to identify products which are more feasible given South Africa’s current product 
space. However, determining a cut-off as to what distance is or is not feasible is not straightforward 
since even large distances can be overcome with sufficient investment (Hausmann and Chauvin, 
2015). However, for the purpose of this paper, the median distance of green products in which South 
Africa does not have a comparative advantage, where the RCA<1, is used as the cut-off. This further 
eliminates 48 products which do not have a Distance of <0.839, leaving 45 products closer to South 




Africa’s productive knowledge frontier. Lastly, Opportunity Gain is used to eliminate the green 
products that would not allow for future diversification paths to grow and open. 8 products provide no 
increase in opportunity gain and therefore, these products are dropped. The 37 remaining products 
all provide potential for future Opportunity Gain. These 37 remaining green products are South Africa’s 
green frontier products. Figure 12, below, illustrates the green frontier products selected using the 
strategy by Hausmann and Chauvin (2015) which accounts for the PCI/Distance trade-off.   









Source: (Own calculations using Comtrade data) 
 
5.4.  South Africa’s Green Frontier Products 
 
Out of the 37 frontier green products identified, the list was narrowed down to 20 products with the 
highest PCIs given that Distance and Opportunity Gain were otherwise similar. This was done to 
narrow down the selection of products to identify a promising product group for further investigation. 
The list of these frontier green products is shown below in Table 3.  
Table 3. South Africa’s Top 20 Frontier Green Products 
 HS Product Name HS 4-
digit 




1 Other lifting machinery 8428 3.25 0.83 1.17 0.32 SWM 
2 Equipment for temperature change of 
materials 
8419 3.08 0.84 1.07 0.22 REP 
3 Industrial furnaces 8417 3.07 0.84 1.19 0.76 SWM 
4 Other parts for machines and 
appliances 
9033 2.91 0.83 0.94 0.29 MON 




5 Other engines and motors 8412 2.80 0.83 1.00 0.48 REP 
6 Parts of railway locomotives 8607 2.69 0.83 1.05 0.53 CRE 
7 Parts for use with electric generators 8503 2.55 0.83 0.94 0.08 REP 
8 Mineral wools and insulating 
materials 
6806 2.55 0.82 0.87 0.40 HEM 
9 Multiple-walled insulating glass 7008 2.48 0.82 0.93 0.12 HEM 
10 Self-propelled bulldozers, excavators 
and road rollers 
8429 2.44 0.82 1.07 0.66 SWM 
11 Trailers and semi-trailers 8716 2.38 0.82 0.94 0.90 CRE 
12 Electric signal and traffic controls 8530 2.26 0.82 0.85 0.67 CRE 
13 Nonwoven textiles 5603 2.11 0.83 0.93 0.36 WAT 
14 Railway track fixtures 8608 2.06 0.82 0.78 0.84 CRE 
15 Gas turbines 8411 2.06 0.84 0.82 0.07 REP 
16 Electric heaters 8516 2.02 0.83 0.74 0.27 SWR 
17 Refrigerators, freezers 8418 2.01 0.83 0.73 0.60 REP 
18 Other plastic plates, sheets etc. 3921 2.01 0.81 0.78 0.25 HEM 
19 Articles of cement, of concrete or of 
artificial stone 
6810 1.95 0.82 0.78 0.31 HEM 
20 Glass fibres  7019 1.85 0.82 0.69 0.12 HEM 
 AVERAGE  2.43 0.83 0.91 0.41  
Note: WAT = Waste water management and portable water treatment; SWR = Clean up or remediation of soil and water; SWM = 
Management of solid and hazardous waste and recycling systems; REP = Renewable energy plant; MON = Environmental monitoring, 
analysis and assessment equipment; HEM = Heat and energy management; CRE = Cleaner or more resource efficient technologies and 
products 
 Source: (Own calculations using Comtrade data) 
The top 5 HS 4 products in the table above are “other lifting machinery,” “equipment for temperature 
change of materials,” “industrial furnaces,” “other parts for machines and appliances” and “other 
engines and motors.” With reference back to the CLEG list, “other lifting machinery” and “ industrial 
furnaces” are categorised under “management of solid and hazardous waste and recycling system”; 
“equipment for temperature change of materials” and “other engines and motors” are categorised 
under “ renewable energy plants”; and “other parts for machines and appliances” are categorised 
under “environmental monitoring, analysis, and assessment equipment” (OECD, 2019).  
The average PCI for these top 20 green frontier products is 2.43 with an average distance of 0.83. 
Interestingly, in a paper by Bhorat et al. (2019) which investigated frontier products for South Africa 
across the entire product space (not only across green goods), the average distance of these top 20 
frontier products was 0.84. While this distance is similar to the average distance of frontier green 
goods in this paper, the average distance for green goods is still closer. This suggests that following 
a path of expansion and growth towards green industries is on the whole, more feasible and attainable 
given the slightly shorter distance.  
Since EGs are not classified at the HS 4-digit level but rather at the HS 6-digit level, and to inform and 
add more granularity to the HS 4-digit level green frontier products identified above, it is important to 
analyse which HS 6-digit level environmental products exhibit potential for future growth opportunities. 




The same process for identifying green frontier products was repeated with the 248 green products 
for the HS 6-digit level data. The process of elimination was completed through eliminating products 
with a PCI below 0.96 and with no potential for future Opportunity Gain. The measure of Distance 
was not accounted for since HS 6-digit level data is not used to create the product space. As an 
additional filter, HS 6-digit level products that did not belong to one of the HS 4-digit level groupings 
that were identified to be a “top 20” green frontier product, were removed. Based on these criteria, 36 
green frontier products at the HS 6-digit level remained. To narrow this selection down to 20 products, 
their respective PCIs were ranked from largest to smallest. The 20 HS 6-digit green frontier products 
are shown in Table 4 below. 
Table 4. Top 20 Frontier products HS 6-digit Level  
 HS 6 Product Name  HS 6-
digit 
PCI Opportunity Gain RCA CLEG 
Category 
1 Mineral heat/sound insulating 
materials 
680690 3.45 1.43 0.69 HEM 
2 Railway rolling stock parts 860799 3.38 1.13 0.22 CRE 
3 Gas turbine engine, not turbo-jet, 
parts 
841199 3.20 1.22 0.02 REP 
4 Non-domestic, non-electric dryer 841939 3.18 1.14 0.24 REP 
5 Machinery for temperature change 841989 3.05 1.03 0.30 REP 
6 Heat exchange units, non-domestic 841950 2.96 0.97 0.13 REP 
7 Bogies & bissel-bogies for railway, 
non-driving 
860712 2.84 0.97 0.46 CRE 
8 Driving bogies & bissel-bogies for 
railway 
860711 2.83 0.98 0.00 CRE 
9 Industrial heating/cooling, parts 841990 2.80 1.06 0.25 REP 
10 Compression refrigeration equipment 841861 2.68 0.92 0.20 REP 
11 Freezing equipment 841869 2.68 0.93 0.52 REP 
12 Coupling devices for railway 860730 2.64 1.06 0.03 CRE 
13 Engines; parts, for engines and 
motors 
841290 2.64 0.99 0.24 REP 
14 Industrial furnaces 841780 2.62 1.05 0.36 SWM 
15 Air brakes for railway 860721 2.56 0.93 0.26 CRE 
16 Parts/accessories for optical/electric 
instrument 
903300 2.55 0.84 0.29 MON 
17 Slag wool, rock wool 680610 2.52 0.80 0.15 HEM 
18 Distilling plant 841940 2.49 0.96 0.40 REP 
19 Mats of glass fibres 701931 2.46 1.07 0.13 HEM 
20 Parts of electric signal & traffic 
controller 
853090 2.40 0.89 0.63 CRE 
Note: SWM = Management of solid and hazardous waste and recycling systems; REP = Renewable energy plant; MON = Environmental 
monitoring, analysis and assessment equipment; HEM = Heat and energy management; CRE = Cleaner or more resource efficient 
technologies and products  
Source: (Own calculations using Comtrade data) 
When looking at South Africa’s green frontier list, the industries and products identified appear to be 
more capital intensive than labour-intensive. For example, green sectors which are labour-intensive 




would include textiles, wood carpentry for construction and industries relating to agro-processing. 
However, some of these industries and products lack the complexity to enhance South Africa’s overall 
ECI and therefore, are not frontier green products. In the South African context, it is critical that new 
industries that are targeted for development have the potential to create employment, especially for 
low to medium-skilled workers. However, it is difficult to derive the total employment benefits that 
could be created from developing various frontier green industries. This is because many of these 
products and industries, by the nature that they are categorised as being EGs, have multiple 
intermediate and end uses (as mentioned in chapter 5.1) and can be used in activities that are both 
sustainable and unsustainable. This makes it difficult to measure future employment potential in the 
green sector and lends itself to the problem of double-counting in possible job creation. Furthermore, 
without the definite known trajectory of the use of these products or industries, it is difficult to ascertain 
the value-chain effects and the indirect potential for job creation along the supply and demand chain. 
Therefore, it is important to identify and target industries that have a clear trajectory toward greening 
the economy and creating sustainable employment opportunities.  
In both tables, products categorised under “renewable energy plant” comprise a significant share of 
these top 20 frontier products. A breakdown of product shares according to their category is shown 
in Figure 13 below. At the HS 4-digit level, REP products comprise 25% of top 20 frontier products 
and at the HS 6-digit level, REP products comprise 45%. 
Figure 13. HS 4 & 6 Top 20 Frontier Green Products 
Source: (IEA, 2018) 
This is a significant finding given South Africa’s dependence on coal and the ongoing struggles in the 
power sector, especially with regards to Eskom, South Africa’s state-owned electricity utility. Since 
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globally (Mathu, 2018). In South Africa, 88% of electricity generation is produced from coal (Mathu, 
2018) with Eskom supplying 95% of South Africa’s energy needs (Eskom, 2019). An unreliable energy 
supply has negatively affected industry in South Africa and has strengthened the need to diversify 
South Africa’s energy mix. The National Development Plan- 2030 (NDP) aims to increase the share 
of renewable energy sources into South Africa’s energy mix, reducing its reliance on coal. 
Furthermore, the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) issued by the Department of Mineral Resources 
and Energy (DMRE) aims to address the deficiencies in the country’s electricity supply chain through 
the development of the independent power producers (IPP) under the governments tendering 
programme for renewable energy, the renewable energy independent power producers’ program 
(REI4P). Within this context, it is important to explore the opportunities for energy production from 
renewable sources in South Africa. Of the products categorised as “REP” in both lists, product HS 
8412, “Other engines” and more specifically at the HS 6-digit level, HS 841290, “Engines; parts, for 
engines and motors” refer to parts for wind turbines and in particular, wind turbine blades, according 
to the OECD CLEG list of environmental products (OECD, 2019). However, it is important to visualise 
where this product lies in South Africa’s product space since the location of a product in the product 
space is predicative of products that a country will likely diversify into (Simoes and Hidalgo, 2011). 
Since products that require similar capabilities tend to be clustered together in the product space, 
identifying the products that are closely linked to HS 8412, “Other engines” can illuminate further 
areas for potential growth since development is path-dependent (Simoes and Hidalgo, 2011).  
 
5.5. Mapping South Africa’s Green Product Space 
 
Complexity network analytics were used as a tool to create South Africa’s green product space. To 
create this product map visualisation, various inputs were needed. The proximity measure was used 
to calculate the proximity between products and allow for the mapping of the product space. To do 
this, the proximity command “genproximity” in the ecomplexity Stata package, developed by 
Sebastian Bustos and Muhammed Yildirm (2014), was used in Stata to calculate the proximity 
between all HS 4 products for South Africa in 2017. After this, only the green HS 4 products were kept 
and used as inputs into the code to create South Africa’s green product space. This was done in order 
to maintain the true structure of South Africa’s product space and highlight proximity of green products 
in relation to this. Furthermore, a list of all HS 4 product codes was used with a dummy variable, 1, 
assigned to the 106 green HS 4 products and a 0, assigned to the product variables that were not 
categorised as being green. In addition, another list of all HS 4 product codes was used again with a 
dummy variable, 1, assigned to the 37 frontier green products and a 0, assigned to all the other 
products. This was needed in order to colour the green frontier nodes in the product space diagram 




in their respective colours whilst leaving the non-frontier green product nodes uncoloured. These 
inputs were inputted into a code developed in Python by Caitlin Allen, a researcher at the 
Development Policy Research (DPRU) Unit at the University of Cape Town, to generate the product 
space (Figure 14).  
Figure 14. South Africa’s Green Product Space 
 
 
Source: (Product space generated by Caitlin Allen, author’s own inputs) 
Key on Product groupings/ clusters by colour: Textiles & Furniture (light green); Vegetables, Foodstuffs & Wood (yellow); 
Stone & Glass (light brown); Minerals (dark brown); Metals (red); Chemicals & Plastics (light purple); Transport Vehicles 
(dark purple); Machinery (blue); Electronics (turquoise); Other (dark blue). 
It is important to note that the coloured nodes represent South Africa’s green frontier products whilst 
the non-coloured nodes are the non-frontier green products. Generally, in the product space, coloured 
nodes represent the products that a country exports with an RCA>1. However, in this case, South 
Africa only exports 7 out of  the 106 green products with an RCA>1 at the HS 4-digit level and 
therefore, the aim is to establish what green products, that South Africa does not yet have a RCA>1 
in, have the potential for future development. The identification of these frontier green products in the 




product space is important in order to establish a possible green growth trajectory for South Africa 
which will increase future competitiveness of its export base given the changing global climate 
towards greener production and goods (UNECA, 2016). As mentioned, South Africa exports very few 
green products and those which it does export, are related to iron and steel or lack product complexity. 
Mealy and Teytelboym (2018) find that green products, on average, tend to be more complex 
suggesting that a challenge in addressing climate change and sustainable development is the fact 
that cleaner energy technologies are relatively sophisticated and require considerable investment and 
expertise.  
When looking at South Africa’s green product space, it is clear that most of the frontier green products 
are clustered closely together indicating the relatedness of these industries in terms of know-how and 
networks needed for further development. Products clustered together in the product space do not 
only require similar capabilities but also, tend to have similar levels of complexity (Hausman, Hidalgo 
et al., 2014). These frontier green products identified have a higher ECI compared to South Africa’s 
export basket overall. Furthermore, the fact that South Africa only exports 7 green products with a 
revealed comparative advantage aligns with Mealy and Teytelboyms (2018) argument, that green 
products tend to be more complex and therefore challenging to develop.  
Therefore, while green diversification may provide an opportunity for South Africa to gain 
competitiveness in this new era of green growth, various constraints and challenges could be 
hindering this process of development. However, the development of one of these industries and the 
added knowledge gained in this process has the potential to spill-over into other, related frontier green 
industries, increasing knowledge and improving the skills-base across the sector. A green frontier 
product that will be explored in this paper is HS product code 8412, “Other engines and motors” 
positioned in the centre of South Africa’s green product space (circled in yellow and highlighted in 
Figure 14). Other frontier green products closely connected to this product (in terms of capabilities 
and know-how needed) include HS code 8702 (motor vehicles for transport >10 persons), HS code 
8606 (railway cars, not self-propelled) and HS code 5603 (non-woven textiles) (circled in red in Figure 
14). Interestingly, non-woven textiles are predominantly used as filters in motor vehicles contributing 
to improved oil and fuel consumption, increased engine performance and enhanced air quality 
(Wilson, 2016). Given that all these products are related to engines, it is likely that the knowledge 
required to develop these products would be overlap and require similar networks to develop.  
As discussed in the section above, “Identifying South Africa’s Frontier Green Products” the HS 6-digit 
product level provides increased granularity. At the HS 6-digit level, the product grouped into the HS 
8412, “Other engines and motors” is HS 861290, “Engines; parts, for engines and motors” which in 
the environmental context, refers specifically to wind turbine blades. While wind turbine blades are 
not related to vehicles, they fit into the engine product grouping since blades turn around a rotor which 




spins a generator and creates electricity (Ragheb and Ragheb, 2016). Preliminary research shows 
that there is significant potential for wind energy generation in South Africa (SAWEA, 2019a). 
Moreover, while the operation of wind farms does not necessarily create many jobs, the manufacturing 
of wind turbine parts such as blades, has the potential to absorb sizeable quantities of semi- to skilled 
labour. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that HS 7019 (glass fibres circled in red in Figure 14), and 
more specifically, “mats of glass fibres” HS 701931, are key inputs into the development of wind 
turbine blades. These products are also identified as being a green frontier product for South Africa. 
Therefore, the growth of one industry has the potential to stimulate the growth of another green 
industry in South Africa, highlighting the connectedness between products in the product space. 
Based on these findings, the potential for the manufacturing of wind turbine blades in South Africa will 
be explored as a possible avenue for growth, diversification and employment generation for the South 
African economy.  
While the total employment effects are difficult to derive for green industries overall, given the dual-
use nature of these products and the difficulty in capturing the indirect employment effects that would 
accompany this growth, it is easier to predict and hypothesise the potential for employment for 
industries and products destined for the renewable energy sector. This is because of the existing 
renewable energy industries and the various studies that have been conducted in South Africa which 
have assessed the impacts of transitioning from coal to renewable energy jobs (IASS and CSIR, 
2019). To explore the potential for growth, diversification and employment creation in the wind turbine 
blade manufacturing sector, a case study was conducted. Interviews were conducted with Dr Fernal 
Abrahams, the Deputy Director of Energy for the Western Cape Government; and Jarrod Lyons, the 
Green Economy Investment and Finance Liaison for GreenCape and Wesgro and the Investment 
Promotions Manager for the Atlantis Special Economic Zone (SEZ). These interviews were 
supplemented with desktop research to verify the interviews and to strengthen the case study.  
 
Chapter 6. The Potential for Wind Turbine Blade Manufacturing in 
South Africa- A Case Study 
 
6.1.  Locating the Wind Industry 
 
According to the Ren21 Report (2019), wind energy is one of the most economical ways of increasing 
generating capacity. However, while lower prices have helped wind power to expand into new 
markets, driving up sales, competition for manufacturers of wind turbines has increased (Ren21, 
2019). Furthermore, the global shift from feed-in-tariffs (FITs) towards competitive mechanisms such 




as tenders and auctions for wind projects, has intensified this competition, resulting in fewer 
manufacturers as intense price competition has excluded many companies along the value chain 
(Ren21, 2019). In 2018, 37 wind turbine manufacturers serviced the global market with the top 10 
companies capturing 85% of the global share, an increase from 80% in 2017 and 75% in 2016 (Ren21, 
2019). The top five manufactures, Vestas (Denmark), GoldWind (China), Siemans Gamesa (Spain), 
GE Renewable Energy (United States) and Envision (China) accounted for nearly two-thirds of the 
total number of turbines delivered in 2018 (Ren21, 2019). However, while most wind turbine 
manufacturing is located in China, the manufacturing of wind turbine components, such as wind 
turbine blades, are increasingly being manufactured close to growing wind energy markets (Ren21, 
2019). This is a strategic move by companies to decrease transport costs and expand into new 
markets.  
At the end of 2018, 4 countries in the Middle-East and 12 countries in Africa had a cumulative capacity 
of 5.7 GW of wind power capacity (onshore) with Morocco (1 GW), Egypt (1.2 GW) and South Africa 
(2.1 GW) accounting for most of this total (Ren21, 2019). According to Ren21 (2019), in the Middle 
East and Africa, South Africa has been identified as being an up-and-coming region for both wind and 
solar power. This is evident when looking at South Africa’s shares in renewable energy generation as 
see in Figure 15. 
Figure 15. South Africa’s share of Renewable Energy Sources   
 
Source: (IEA, 2018) 
In 2015, the renewable energy industry in South Africa accounted for 85% of Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into the country in the form of foreign equity and financing (equity and debt) (DoE, 2015; 
SAWEA, 2018a). In 2018, South Africa received USD 3.9 billion in investment for renewables, an 
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This was largely due to the re-invigoration of the country’s renewable energy auction programme, the 
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Programme (REI4P), after two years of delays 
(Ren21, 2019).  Furthermore, according to the International Energy Association (IEA), global 
investments in renewable energy are expected to increase by over a third by 2022 with wind power 
expected to comprise approximately 40% of investments (SAWEA, 2018a). Significantly, the IEA 
predicted that within South Africa, wind is expected to be the largest form of renewable energy by 
2022 (SAWEA, 2018a). In absolute terms and growth, South Africa is the leader in the region for non-
hydro renewable generation. Given these strong market indicators for the wind sector in South Africa, 
it seems likely that there exist various opportunities for wind turbine manufacturing to grow this 
industry.  
 
6.2.  Manufacturing Potential 
 
Renewable energy procurement in South Africa occurs through a competitive bidding process known 
as the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Programme (REI4P). The REI4P was 
launched in 2011 with the aim of achieving energy security, economic development and 
environmental sustainability in line with South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP) (SAWEA, 
2019a). This programme aimed to achieve the procurement of low-cost electricity, increased local 
manufacturing, increased local job creation and increased South African ownership, as well as South 
African Black ownership (SAWEA, 2019a). To date, South Africa has 22 commercially operating wind 
power plants with a total installed capacity of 2078 MW (SAWEA, 2019b). These wind power plants 
are distributed across 3 provinces and account for 52% of South Africa’s renewable energy power 
generation (SAWEA, 2019b). However, despite these positive trends, South Africa’s wind energy 
industry is still in its infancy and is comprised mainly of wind turbine Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEMs) (DTI, 2015). In South Africa, wind turbine towers are locally manufactured by two companies, 
DCD Wind Towers and Gestamp Renewable Industries (GRI). Towers tend to be the first components 
of a wind turbine to be locally produced since they are expensive, large and difficult to transport over 
far distances (Abrahams, 2019). In addition to the production of wind turbine towers, internals for wind 
towers which include lifts, ladders, doors as well as other electrical and mechanical parts are 
manufactured locally by RESOLUX AFRICA.  
While no blade manufacturing for wind turbines exist currently in South Africa, the country possesses 
the skills and expertise given its ability to manufacture blades for other purposes, such as helicopters 
(DTI, 2015). Furthermore, Isivunguvungu Wind Energy Converter (I-WEC) was a local company that 
produced South Africa’s first wind turbine blade in 2011, boasting a local content of approximately 
80% with fibreglass, the main input material, being sourced locally (DTI, 2015). However, I-WEC was 




forced to close down in 2013. Fernal Abrahams (2019), Deputy Director of Energy for the Western 
Cape Government, argues that in the wind turbine manufacturing sector, financial support is 
paramount. If a company is manufacturing wind turbine blades for a project, they need to guarantee 
that these blades will be operational for 20 years and will be able to produce the level of energy 
agreed upon in a contract (Abrahams, 2019). To ensure this, international testing of at least one year 
and international certification is needed. I-WEC, South Africa’s first wind turbine blade manufacturing 
plant, was unable to secure this due to a lack of financial support which prevented them from 
manufacturing and installing enough blades to get certified while maintaining their financial health 
(Abrahams, 2019). Furthermore, Abrahams (2019) says that developers prefer to do business with 
firms that they know. Given that I-WEC did not have an established reputation and trade history, this 
inhibited their potential for growth (Abrahams, 2019).  
While the global dynamics for many OEMs suggest strong vertical integration of supply chains, it is 
not unusual for OEMs to outsource production of wind turbine components and focus on their core 
competencies where they have a comparative advantage (DTI, 2015). Therefore, it is common for 
OEMs to localise the production of their wind turbine blades provided there is sufficient demand in the 
local market (DTI, 2015). Since South Africa already has wind tower manufacturers and RESOLUX, 
a manufacturer of internals for towers, Abrahams (2019) believes that there is potential to attract a 
manufacturer of wind blades which will then attract manufacturers of other parts (Abrahams, 2019). 
Once manufacturing companies of different elements of a wind turbine are clustered together, the 
potential for future business and opportunities increases as the industry becomes established 
(Abrahams, 2019). However, to attract suppliers and develop a supply chain, the market needs to be 
big enough to guarantee that the investment is worthwhile (Lyons, 2019). According to the DTI report 
(2015) a minimum capacity of 400MW annually is needed to attract OEMs to establish local blade 
manufacturing facilities. Therefore, the market would need to exceed the 400MW threshold for 
another blade manufacturer to enter the market.  
The promulgated Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2019, South Africa’s policy blueprint for the power 
sector, was recently promulgated in October 2019. Up until 2021, 1362MW of generating capacity 
has already been committed to the generation of wind energy. From 2022 until 2030, an annual 
allocated capacity of 1600MW for wind energy was set. It is envisioned in the plan that by 2030, wind 
will account for 17.8% of South Africa’s annual energy generation which places wind energy as the 
second largest producer of energy after coal at a projected 58.8%. This is a significant increase from 
the projected 13.8% of wind energy by 2030 which was projected in the last promulgated IRP released 
in 2011. The increased allowance of wind energy in the IRP sends a strong positive signal for the 
wind manufacturing industry and support for further localisation. Based on this projection, there is 
significant opportunity for the establishment of more than one wind turbine blade manufacturer firm in 




South Africa given that the allocated annual capacity (from 2022) of 1600MW exceeds the 400MW 
annual threshold needed in order to attract an OEM into the market.  
Prior to the promulgated 2019 IRP, Jarred Lyons, the Investment Promotion Officer of the Atlantis 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ), said that this positive signal for further wind generation already started 
increasing investor interest when the IRP 2018 draft was released. LM Wind Power, which was 
recently bought by General Electric (GE), is currently interested in establishing a wind turbine blade 
manufacturing factory in South Africa (Lyons, 2019). Now that the IRP has been promulgated, this 
should help to transform interest into commitment. However, LM Wind Power had hoped to establish 
a blade manufacturing factory five years ago (Abrahams, 2019). At the time, there was uncertainty in 
the South African market and consequently, LM Wind Power opted to establish a factory in Brazil 
instead. However, now that talks have re-emerged, LM Wind Power would prove to be a strategic 
investor since they produce blades for a range of OEMs. This is the success of their business model 
in that production is not limited to a certain OEM, allowing for a wider market to supply to (Abrahams, 
2019). Therefore, should they establish a factory in South Africa, the expertise and knowledge for the 
production of a range of wind turbine blades would be transferred to South African workers.  
 
6.3.  Potential for Job Creation 
 
In terms of the potential for job creation, both Lyons (2019) and Abrahams (2019) believe that wind 
turbine blade manufacturing would have a significantly positive affect on the South African labour 
market. At the peak of GRIs manufacturing performance, 320 people were employed at a technically 
skilled level. These workers received specialist training with many afforded the opportunity to receive 
training overseas too (Abrahams, 2019). Abrahams (2019) believes that this process and outcome 
would be similar for the wind turbine blade sector. However, while blade manufacturing is extremely 
labour-intensive requiring high levels of precision, it also requires a semi- to skilled labour force. Given 
South Africa’s lack of skilled labour and need for low-skill labour-absorbing industries, this is 
problematic. However, Abrahams (2019) argues that these workers would not necessarily require a 
degree. While engineers are needed at these factories, most of the work requires technical skills 
which are learnt on the job (Abrahams, 2019). Furthermore, Lyons (2019) says that in his 
engagements with LM Wind Power and other multi-national renewable energy investors, it is apparent 
that while they are not particularly interested in employing unskilled labour, this is also not a deterrent. 
By the very design of these companies, ‘on the job’ training is more important than previously acquired 
degrees or skills. Therefore, these companies, such as LM Wind Power, place a greater emphasis on 
having access to a pool of labour in South Africa as opposed to skilled workers since there will be on-
the-line training (Lyons, 2019). This makes sense since these industries are bespoke and while the 




theory of an engineer, for example, is important, the knowledge to produce a wind turbine blade is 
learned. Lyons (2019) believes that should LM Wind Power establish a manufacturing factory, 200-
250 jobs would be created accompanied by a R400 million investment. This would allow for 
approximately 40-50 % of the South African market to be serviced which means that there would still 
be a need for at least another blade manufacturer, if not more (Lyons, 2019).  
In terms of potential for job creation, 200-250 new jobs is a small number in comparison to 
employment in coal power stations. The Medupi coal power station, for example, employs 
approximately 600 to 800 people fulltime (Gosling, 2019). This is considerably more than a wind 
turbine blade manufacturing plant or a wind farm. However, this is not an accurate comparison as the 
Medupi coal power station generates 100 times more energy than South Africa’s largest wind farm 
(Gosling, 2019). According to former Eskom engineer, Tobias Bischof-Niemz, the correct comparison 
would be to compare the number of permanent jobs created per unit of energy generated. This 
measurement shows that renewable energy is actually more labour-intensive than coal and therefore, 
net employment is higher in the renewable energy sector compared to the coal sector. However, 
comparing employment data across the coal and renewable energy sector is challenging and 
complex. In South Africa, studies on employment across sectors do not use a standardised metric 
and methodology which makes it difficult to compare these results (SAWEA, 2018b). For example, 
employment can be measured by the total number of jobs created without specifying how long these 
jobs last for or, they can be measured according to a job-year. In the energy sector, jobs created per 
MW of installed capacity is a more suitable metric however, this measurement does not account for 
the investment required to generate these jobs. Without a standardised measure of employment, 
studies that estimate the job creation potential of these different energy sectors are highly metric, and 
context specific and therefore, results should be interpreted with caution.   
 
6.4.  Export Potential 
 
While there is potential and a market for the establishment of wind blade manufacturing in South 
Africa, South Africa’s location poses a significant barrier for further market expansion and export 
potential. Potential markets for South Africa could include South America, Australia and Africa given 
the establishment of wind farms and wind potential in these regions. However, South America already 
has established wind turbine blade manufacturers and since Australia is located near to China, the 
cost of doing business with China is cheaper (Abrahams, 2019). This cost is directly related to 
proximity since currently, in terms of cost of labour between South Africa and China, there is relatively 
little difference (Abrahams, 2019). Therefore, it is ultimately distance that impacts on South Africa’s 
ability to export competitively. On the African continent, markets for wind turbine blades exist in 




Morocco, Egypt and Kenya, however, India’s close proximity to these countries drastically reduces 
transport costs of delivery (Lyons, 2019). LM Wind Power has reiterated this and said that they would 
first focus on the South African market and thereafter, seek out market opportunities in Botswana and 
Namibia (Lyons, 2019). As it stands, the entirety of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) region market size is equal to the market size of South Africa (Lyons, 2019). This market is 
not currently big enough to sell to investors as an export opportunity. However, Abrahams (2019) 
posits that the sub-Saharan market needs to be explored further regarding export opportunities since 
to the best of his knowledge, there has not been any in-depth market research conducted for wind 
turbine manufacturing and in particular, export potential.  
 
6.5.  Barriers to Development 
 
Within South Africa, the policy space has arguably been (and still is) the biggest barrier for the 
development of local manufacturing at a utility scale. The inconsistency with South Africa’s REI4P 
has been detrimental for the development of the wind turbine manufacturing industry and the 
development of the renewable industry at large. In 2015, after the announcement of the preferred 
bidders for round 4 of the REI4P were announced, the energy minister at the time announced that 
round 4 would be followed by an expediated round announcement (SAWEA, 2019a). However, this 
did not come to fruition and instead, a three-year stalemate followed the signing of the Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) for round 4 bidders and the subsequent cancellation of the ‘expediated 
round’ was enacted. This has had detrimental effects on local manufacturing with many companies 
having to close down or reduce operations as a result (SAWEA, 2019a). For example, despite 
RESOLUX’s available capacity and knowledge to manufacturer and produce internals for wind turbine 
towers, the company currently operates as a distribution centre, importing components and supplying 
to the local market (Lyons, 2019). In order for RESOLUX to begin manufacturing these products 
again, a significant amount of offtake is required before manufacturing becomes financially feasible. 
Uncertainty in the market caused by the REI4P hiatus has hindered local demand. Furthermore, GRI 
in Atlantis had to put their workers on 30% time due to the slump in the market and were only able to 
remain in business because they were able to diversify their supply base, supplying wind towers not 
only to the local market but also to Brazil (Abrahams, 2019; Lyons, 2019). Only with the recent revival 
of the REI4P and signing of contracts for round 4 did demand increase, allowing these companies to 
increase capacity once more.  
Moreover, Lyons (2019) argues that a lack of manufacturing in the wind turbine sector is also partly 
due to the local content requirements. While the DTI had the intention of promoting local 
manufacturing through the introduction of local content requirements in the REI4P bidding rounds, 




industry interpreted these requirements to include the entire production process from importing parts 
to the eventual installation of these parts (Lyons, 2019). Therefore, instead of promoting local 
manufacturing development, parts (such as solar panels or wind turbine blades) were imported from 
China. To make up for the local content requirements, South African firms were made responsible for 
the logistical aspects and installation of these parts (Lyons, 2019). Therefore, a lack of local 
development and manufacturing has taken place, contrary to the initial intention of the DTI.  
Abraham (2019) adds that over the past few months, there has been further debate about South 
Africa’s energy sector. Arguments for pursuing nuclear have been revived and coal lobbyists are 
perpetuating the narrative that job losses in the sector will further damage the economy (Overy, 2019). 
Overall, renewable energy is incorrectly portrayed as the most expensive form of energy generation 
despite the fact that coal now costs R1.30 a kilowatt-hour compared to renewables at 60 cents 
(Abrahams, 2019; Bloom, 2019a). The significant backlash and lobbying against renewable energy 
projects significantly impact on the likelihood of success for wind blade manufacturing in South Africa 
according to Abrahams (2019). This narrative needs to be changed and rectified in order to alleviate 
political pressure and create a positive business environment for investment. Because the policy 
space has been unstable, there has been a lack of local demand driving this sector. Local demand 
would come from companies awarded contracts under the REI4P (Lyons, 2019). The stalemate of 
round 4 of the REI4P meant that local demand contracted significantly. The poor policy space and 
subsequent lack of demand has prevented South Africa from being a first mover and establishing a 
reputation for wind blade manufacturing.  
 
6.6.  Opportunities for Development 
 
While policy uncertainty and seemingly limited potential for export markets has hampered the potential 
for wind blade manufacturing in South Africa, it is important to note that data trends do not always 
predict future opportunities. There are various factors to consider when investigating the potential into 
an industry. Lyons (2019) is optimistic about the potential for wind blade manufacturing development 
in South Africa. He argues that leadership plays a critical role in enabling or disabling this potential. 
President Cyril Ramaphosa appears to be in favour of promoting renewable energy industries and 
recently sent a statement to the UN Climate Summit in New York, with reference to an $11-billion 
renewables funding facility. While this deal has since been excised from governments statement, 
members from the Presidents Eskom Sustainability Task Team have confirmed that this was a 
recommendation made to the President (Bloom, 2019a). Therefore, South Africa needs to 
strategically align industrial opportunities with the country’s vision, especially if it is coming from the 
top tiers of leadership in the country (Lyons, 2019).  In addition, the DTI is also committed to rectifying 




the local content requirement policies and ensuring that these policies promote local content in 
manufacturing activities. The DTI recently engaged proactively with local manufacturers and potential 
manufacturers on issues faced with the local content policies imposed by the REI4P (Lyons, 2019). 
While policy has not yet changed, this proactive step is likely to result in increased interest in solar 
PV and wind turbine manufacturing since it is highly probable that there will be a change in policy 
towards more stringent local content requirements for these various projects (Lyons, 2019). 
Furthermore, Abrahams (2019) argues that the unbundling of Eskom into operation, transmission and 
distribution, may open up the market for renewable energy projects such as the manufacturing of wind 
turbine blades. However, it ultimately depends on whether or not the Minister of Mineral Resources 
and Energy, Gwede Mantashe, is committed to a sustainable agenda. In April 2019, the Minister 
urged the coal sector to pushback against the perception that the industry was dirty (Bloom, 2019a). 
However, he has since changed his position and has argued that South Africa needs to shift towards 
cleaner technologies and consider the impacts of climate change (Bloom, 2019a). This signals a 
positive commitment towards the renewable energy sector however, given that the Minister is 
responsible for both energy and mineral affairs, mining might have significant access to him and 
prevent this sustainable agenda from being prioritised (Abrahams, 2019).  
The SAWEA (2019) report strongly argues that investment in local manufacturing in the wind sector 
is dependent on a sufficiently large market and specified megawatt procurement allocations from year 
to year. The IRP, which the government has committed an allocated capacity of 1600MW annually 
from 2022 until 2030 for wind energy proves to be a positive step in promoting investor confidence 
and certainty in the sector (DMRE, 2019). In addition, round 4 of the REI4P was signed on 4 April 
2018 which allowed GRI to revive its manufacturing of towers for these designated projects and sent 
a positive signal to investors, re-igniting talks with LM Wind Power. The potential opportunities for 
wind turbine blade manufacturing are directly contingent on South Africa’s REI4P programme. In order 
to maintain this momentum and secure investor confidence, it is paramount that the REI4P continue 
with continuity, certainty and transparency with subsequent rounds occurring within 12-18 months of 
the prior round (Lyons, 2019; SAWEA, 2019a).  The success of this industry is dependent on the size 
of the market, support for local industry and a long-term strategy.  
 
6.7.  Discussion 
 
Analysis from trade and environmental indicators show that there exists a strong correlation between 
positive policy and regulation on EGs and the growth in net exports of equipment for renewable energy 
plants (OECD, 2019). Conversely, countries that continued to spend a large proportion of their GDP 
on subsidising and supporting fossil fuel activities, seemed to hurt the competitiveness of their 




renewable energy industry domestically (OECD, 2019). In South Africa, it is estimated that $4.2 billion 
(R56.6 billion) is spent annually on coal subsidies, making it the fourth largest subsidiser of coal out 
of the G20 countries (Bloom, 2019b). According to the South African country study by the ODI, 
approximately $3.4 billion was given over the 2016/17 year for SOE subsidies comprising 
predominantly of Eskom’s coal-fired Medupi and Kusile power plants (Bloom, 2019b).  
This support for the coal-power sector through subsidies has implications for development of the 
renewable sector, especially with regards to the development of wind manufacturing industries as 
well as other clean technologies. These subsidies allow for the improper pricing of coal-power, 
allowing this source of energy to remain competitive. However, within the South African context, the 
economy is reliant on coal and commodities which dominate the export sector. In addition, coal mining 
employs 82 000 people with Eskom employing a further 50 000 people (Kings, 2019). Given South 
Africa’s high unemployment rate and stagnant economic growth, it is understandable that 
maintenance of these norms and strong support for the coal sector continues. However, since the 
inception of the REI4P in 2011 to 2018, 31 072 job-years were needed in construction and another 
5456 job-years were needed in operations in the renewable energy sector (Bischof-Niemz, 2019). 
Moreover, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Integrated Energy Plan (2016) includes a study of the 
employment needs for different power generating technologies including coal-fired power plants and 
wind and solar PV plants. This study assessed the yearly energy output of these different power 
generating technologies, accounting for the respective production rates, maintenance and lifespan of 
both the coal and renewable energy operations. Their findings showed that at least 30% more jobs 
would be needed in the renewable fleet (wind and solar photovoltaic farms) compared to the energy-
equivalent coal fleet (Bischof-Niemz, 2019). While these findings are not certain given the lack of 
standardisation across employment metrics and difficulty in predicting the future of the energy sector, 
it is important to look at global supply and demand trends in this sector. In a recent report entitled, 
“Understanding the impact of a low carbon transition on South Africa,” it was found that should the 
world achieve a growth path consistent with the Paris Agreement targets, while South Africa continues 
to rely on coal and other commodities for exports, South Africa will face a ‘transition risk’ of 
approximately R1.8 trillion in present value terms (Huxham et al., 2019). Most of this risk would fall 
on the public balance sheet, straining public finances and jeopardising the country’s sovereign credit 
rating (Huxham et al., 2019). Therefore, while climate change is transforming the global economy, 
South Africa has a very narrow and constrained time-frame in which to act and transition into a more 
sustainable and low-carbon development path.  
However, even if South Africa pursues a green growth agenda covering all sectors of the economy, 
these findings cannot be isolated from various other factors at play, namely, the need for workers 
equipped with the skills to operate in this new and transitioning space and the fact that many of the 
green frontier sectors identified are capital intensive. South Africa, therefore, needs to be strategic in 




the sectors and industries it targets to transform the economy in line with a green, sustainable agenda. 
Whilst this transformative process will take time, strong leadership is needed along with enabling 
government policy to create a favourable environment for investment into these renewable energy 
manufacturing industries. According to the OECD findings (2019), creating a policy environment 
which is favourable to the deployment of renewable energy, increases the demand for environmental 
goods domestically. This can lead to an increase in imports of these goods if local firms are unable 
to supply these goods (OECD, 2019). Alternatively, the same policy environment has the potential to 
increase incentives, stimulating innovation in local firms and creating long-term competitiveness of 
related industries, thus possibly decreasing demand for imports and in turn, increasing exports 
(OECD, 2019). Therefore, countries that provide strong support for the renewable energy industry 
could help to strengthen their trade balance in relation to these industries. This enabling environment 
and government leadership will not only be needed to create an enabling, investor-friendly 
environment but also be needed across the economy. The education sector in particular will need to 
be targeted and transformed in order to meet the needs of these future industries and equip South 
Africans with the skills to partake in the green economy.  
 
Chapter 7. Conclusion  
 
The economic complexity method provides a scientifically rigorous method based on complexity to 
give key product-level insight into South Africa’s development path in line with a green economy, 
identifying potential products and possible industries for diversification. It provides empirical evidence 
to support the structuralist view that argues production sophistication is the prime avenue in which to 
overcome underdevelopment (Gala et al., 2018). This methodology incorporates large volumes of 
trade data, allowing for more accurate and disaggregated information which can positively inform 
development theory and policymakers to allow for better-informed decision making for industrial policy 
and overall country strategy (Simoes and Hidalgo, 2011). 
However, while the economic complexity methodology is important because it further helps explain 
levels of income and aids in the prediction of future growth, it cannot account for the institutional and 
social factors which can impede or propel growth. In the case of South Africa, while a sustainable 
development agenda is supported on paper, reliance on coal power poses a serious threat to this 
agenda, not only because it comprises a large proportion of South Africa’s exports but also because 
it absorbs a large portion of labour. Therefore, while this paper has identified opportunities for 
diversification potential based on the country’s existing knowledge and skills, the process of 
diversification is complex, involving various actors and forces. Growth and diversification are not 
based solely on a country’s capabilities in determining future growth but also on the strength of 




institutions, political will and social context among other factors. While the complexity methodology is 
unable to account for these forces, if anything, it provides a robust entry point in identifying prospects 
for future growth and helping to inform policy going forward.  
In the context of green growth, it is paramount that policymakers place economic growth at the centre 
of environmental management discussions. In South Africa, the triple threat of poverty, inequality and 
unemployment means that in addition to the growth factor, policymakers must also consider the 
impacts of environmental policies in terms of job creation and social upliftment. South Africa’s reliance 
on mineral products and energy-intensive sectors is a significant stumbling block, that unless 
addressed, will impede any meaningful effort South Africa may attempt to follow the diversification 
path towards green industries and products as is clearly seen in the green product space. This will 
maintain the current status quo - the underdevelopment of these green products and industries. 
However, the global shift towards greener development and technologies make it critical for South 
Africa to redirect its growth path towards more sustainable industries. This will not only allow for future 
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OECD Combined List of Environmental Goods  
HS 2007 Category Product Name HS 1992 Product Name 
380210 WAT Carbon, activated 380210 Carbon, activated 
390940 HEM Phenolic resins 390940 Phenolic resins 
392010 SWM Plastic sheet, ethylene 392010 Plastic sheet, ethylene 
392030 HEM Plastic sheet, styrene 392030 Plastic sheet, styrene 
392111 HEM Plastic sheet, cellular of styrene 392111 Plastic sheet, cellular of styrene 
392113 HEM Plastic sheet, cellular of 
polyurethane 
392113 Plastic sheet, cellular of 
polyurethane 
392510 REP Plastic tanks, <300 L 392510 Plastic tanks, <300 L 
400259 SWM Rubber, NBR, not latex 400259 Rubber, NBR, not latex 
441872 EPP Assembled flooring panels, 
multilayer 
441830 Parquet panels 
450410 NVA Agglomerated cork blocks 450410 Agglomerated cork blocks 
450490 HEM Agglomerated cork articles 450490 Agglomerated cork articles 
530310 EPP Jute, raw 530310 Jute, raw 
530500 EPP Other 530599 Other 
540500 HEM Artificial monofilament, > 67dtex 540500 Artificial monofilament, > 67dtex 
560314 WAT Nonwovens; whether or not 
impregnated, coated, covered or 
laminated, of manmade filaments, 
(weighing more than 150g/m2) 
560300 Nonwovens; whether or not 
impregnated, coated, covered or 
laminated, of manmade filaments, 
(weighing more than 150g/m2) 
560721 EPP Binder twine, sisal 560721 Binder twine, sisal 
560790 EPP Twine ropes, other materials 560790 Twine ropes, other materials 
560811 NRP Made up fishing nets, manmade 
material 
560811 Made up fishing nets, manmade 
material 
560890 NRP Knotted netting, natural material 560890 Knotted netting, natural material 
630510 EPP Sacks & bags, packing, of jute/bast 
fibres 
630510 Sacks & bags, packing, of jute/bast 
fibres 
680610 HEM Slag wool, rock wool 680610 Slag wool, rock wool 
680690 HEM Mineral heat/sound insulating 
materials 
680690 Mineral heat/sound insulating 
materials 
680800 HEM Boards, of veg fibre with 
mineral/cement 
680800 Boards, of veg fibre with 
mineral/cement 
681011 HEM Building blocks, bricks of 
cement/artificial stone 
681011 Building blocks, bricks of 
cement/artificial stone 
681019 HEM Tiles of cement, concrete 681019 Tiles of cement, concrete 
681091 HEM Prefab structural items of 
cement/concrete 
681091 Prefab structural items of 
cement/concrete 
691010 WAT Porcelain bathroom, kitchen 
fixtures 
691010 Porcelain bathroom, kitchen fixtures 
700800 HEM Multiple-walled insulating glass 700800 Multiple-walled insulating glass 
700991 REP Glass mirrors, unframed 700991 Glass mirrors, unframed 
700992 REP Glass mirrors, framed 700992 Glass mirrors, framed 
701931 HEM Mats of glass fibres 701931 Mats of glass fibres 
701939 HEM Webs, nonwoven fibreglass 
products 
701939 Webs, nonwoven fibreglass 
products 
730210 CRE Rails, iron 730210 Rails, iron 
730230 CRE Rail crossing material, iron 730230 Rail crossing material, iron 
730240 CRE Rail sole plates, iron 730240 Rail sole plates, iron 




730290 CRE Rail construction material, iron 730290 Rail construction material, iron 
730300 WAT Tubes, cast iron 730300 Tubes, cast iron 
730431 WAT Pipe, iron, cold rolled, nes 730431 Pipe, iron, cold rolled, nes 
730490 WAT Pipe, iron or steel, nes 730490 Pipe, iron or steel, nes 
730630 WAT Pipes, iron/steel, welded, nes 
<406mm 
730630 Pipes, iron/steel, welded, nes 
<406mm 
730690 WAT Tubes, iron/steel, riveted <406mm 730690 Tubes, iron/steel, riveted <406mm 
730820 REP Towers, iron/steel 730820 Towers, iron/steel 
730890 REP Structures, iron/steel, nes 730890 Structures, iron/steel, nes 
730900 WAT Tanks, iron/steel, >300L 730900 Tanks, iron/steel, >300L 
731010 WAT Tank, iron/steel, 50-300L 731010 Tank, iron/steel, 50-300L 
731029 WAT Cans, iron/steel, <50L, nes 731029 Cans, iron/steel, <50L, nes 
732111 CRE Cooking appliances for gas, iron 732111 Cooking appliances for gas, iron 
732119 REP Other cooking appliances & plate 
warmers incl. appliances for solid 
fuel, other than for gas fuel/for both 
gas & other fuels/liquid fuel. 
732113 Cooking appliances and plate 
warmers :-- For solid fuel 
732189 REP Non-electric domestic appliances, 
& parts thereof, of iron/steel (incl. 
appliances for solid fuel), other than 
for gas fuel/for both gas & other 
fuels/liquid fuel. 
732183 Other appliances :-- For solid fuel 
732190 CRE Parts, non-electric thermic 
appliances, iron 
732190 Parts, non-electric thermic 
appliances, iron 
732490 WAT Sanitary ware, iron 732490 Sanitary ware, iron 
732510 WAT Cast articles, non-malleable cast 
iron 
732510 Cast articles, non-malleable cast 
iron 
732690 WAT Articles of iron/steel, nes 732690 Articles of iron/steel, nes 
761090 REP Aluminum structures for 
construction 
761090 Aluminum structures for 
construction 
761100 REP Aluminum tanks, >300L 761100 Aluminum tanks, >300L 
761290 SWM Aluminum casks, <300L 761290 Aluminum casks, <300L 
830630 REP Frames, metal 830630 Frames, metal 
840219 SWM Boilers, nes 840219 Boilers, nes 
840290 SWM Boiler parts, nes 840290 Boiler parts, nes 
840410 APC Auxiliary plant for boilers 840410 Auxiliary plant for boilers 
840420 APC Condensers for steam power units 840420 Condensers for steam power units 
840490 APC Auxiliary plant for boilers, parts 840490 Auxiliary plant for boilers, parts 
840510 APC Water gas generator producer 840510 Water gas generator producer 
840681 REP Turbines; steam and other vapour 
turbines, (for other than marine 
propulsion), of an output exceeding 
40MW 
840619 Activate carbon 
840682 REP Turbines; steam and other vapour 
turbines, (for other than marine 
propulsion), of an output not 
exceeding 40MW 
840619 Activate carbon 
840690 REP Steam turbines, parts 840690 Steam turbines, parts 
840991 NVA Spark-ignition engine, parts nes 840991 Spark-ignition engine, parts nes 
840999 NVA Diesel engine, parts 840999 Diesel engine, parts 
841011 REP Water wheels, <1000kW 841011 Water wheels, <1000kW 
841012 REP Water wheels, 1000-10000 kW 841012 Water wheels, 1000-10000 kW 
841013 REP Water wheels, > 10000kW 841013 Water wheels, > 10000kW 
841090 REP Water wheels, parts 841090 Water wheels, parts 
841181 REP Gas turbine egine, nes <5000 kW 841181 Gas turbine egine, nes <5000 kW 




841182 REP Gas turbine engine, nes >5000 kW 841182 Gas turbine engine, nes >5000 kW 
841199 REP Gas turbine engine, not turbo-jet, 
parts 
841199 Gas turbine engine, not turbo-jet, 
parts 
841280 REP Engines; pneumatic power engines 
and motors, n.e.c 
841280 Hydraulic/pneumatic power engine, 
parts  
841290 REP Engines; parts, for engines and 
motor 
841290 Engines and motors, nes 
841320 WAT Hand pumps, not measuring 841320 Hand pumps, not measuring 
841350 WAT Reciprocating pumps, nes 841350 Reciprocating pumps, nes 
841360 WAT Rotary pumps, nes 841360 Rotary pumps, nes 
841370 WAT Centrifugal pumps, nes 841370 Centrifugal pumps, nes 
841381 WAT Pumps, nes 841381 Pumps, nes 
841410 APC Vacuum pumps 841410 Vacuum pumps 
841430 APC Compressors for refrigeration 841430 Compressors for refrigeration 
841440 APC Air compressors, for towing 841440 Air compressors, for towing 
841459 APC Fans, motor > 125 W 841459 Fans, motor > 125 W 
841480 APC Air compressor, hoods 841480 Air compressor, hoods 
841490 APC Pumps, compressors, etc. parts 841490 Pumps, compressors, etc. parts 
841581 REP Air conditioners, reverse cycle 841581 Air conditioners, reverse cycle 
841780 SWM Industrial furnaces, nes 841780 Industrial furnaces, nes 
841790 SWM Industrial furnace, parts 841790 Industrial furnace, parts 
841861 REP Compression refrigeration 
equipment 
841861 Compression refrigeration 
equipment 
841869 REP Freezing equipment, nes 841869 Freezing equipment, nes 
841919 REP Water heaters, no electric, nes 841919 Water heaters, no electric, nes 
841939 WAT Non-domestic, non-electric dryer 841939 Non-domestic, non-electric dryer 
841940 SWM Distilling plant 841940 Distilling plant 
841950 HEM Heat exchange units, non-domestic 841950 Heat exchange units, non-domestic 
841960 APC Machinery for liquefying gases 841960 Machinery for liquefying gases 
841989 WAT Machinery for temperature change 841989 Machinery for temperature change 
841990 REP Industrial heating/cooling, parts 841990 Industrial heating/cooling, parts 
842119 SWR Centrifuges, nes 842119 Centrifuges, nes 
842121 WAT Water filtering machines 842121 Water filtering machines 
842129 WAT Filter machine, liquids, nes 842129 Filter machine, liquids, nes 
842139 APC Filtering machinery, gases, nes 842139 Filtering machinery, gases, nes 
842191 SWR Centrifuge parts, nes 842191 Centrifuge parts, nes 
842199 WAT Filter machine, parts 842199 Filter machine, parts 
842220 SWM Machinery for cleaning/drying 
bottles/containers 
842220 Machinery for cleaning/drying 
bottles/containers 
842290 SWM Parts of washing, filling, closing 
machinery 
842290 Parts of washing, filling, closing 
machinery 
842833 SWM Continuous goods conveyor or 
elevator belt 
842833 Continuous goods conveyor or 
elevator belt 
842940 SWM Tamping machines & road rollers, 
self-propelled 
842940 Tamping machines & road rollers, 
self-propelled 
846291 SWM Hydraulic presses for working metal 846291 Hydraulic presses for working metal 
846596 SWM Splitting or slicing machines for 
wood 
846596 Splitting or slicing machines for 
wood 
846599 SWM Machine tools for wood, cork or 
hard plastic 
846599 Machine tools for wood, cork or 
hard plastic 
846694 SWM Parts of metal shaping machine 
tools 
846694 Parts of metal shaping machine 
tools 
847420 SWM Machines to crush stone, ores, 
minerals 
847420 Machines to crush stone, ores, 
minerals 
847982 SWM Machines to mix, knead, grind, nes 847982 Machines to mix, knead, grind, nes 




847989 SWM Machines & mechanical appliances 
nes 
847989 Machines & mechanical appliances 
nes 
847990 SWM Parts of machines & mechanical 
appliances nes 
847990 Parts of machines & mechanical 
appliances nes 
848110 WAT Valves, pressure reducing 848110 Valves, pressure reducing 
848130 WAT Valves, check 848130 Valves, check 
848140 WAT Valves, safety or relief 848140 Valves, safety or relief 
848180 WAT Taps, cocks, valves, appliances, 
nes 
848180 Taps, cocks, valves, appliances, 
nes 
848190 WAT Parts of taps, cocks, valves 848190 Parts of taps, cocks, valves 
848340 REP Gearing, ball screws 848340 Gearing, ball screws 
848360 REP Clutches, shaft couplings, universal 
joints 
848360 Clutches, shaft couplings, universal 
joints 
850161 REP AC generators, of an output <75 
kVA 
850161 AC generators, of an output <75 
kVA 
850162 REP AC generators, 75-375 kVA 850162 AC generators, 75-375 kVA 
850163 REP AC generators, 375-750 kVA 850163 AC generators, 375-750 kVA 
850164 REP AC generators, >750kVA 850164 AC generators, >750kVA 
850220 HEM Generating sets, spark ignition 
engines 
850220 Generating sets, spark ignition 
engines 
850231 REP Electric generating sets; wind-
powered, (excluding those with 
spark-ignition or compression-
ignition internal combustion piston 
engines) 
850230 Steam turbines, parts 
850239 REP Electric generating sets; (excluding 
those with spark-ignition or 
compression-ignition internal 
combustion piston engines), other 
than wind powered 
850230 Steam turbines, parts 
850300 REP Parts for electric motors & 
generators 
850300 Parts for electric motors & 
generators 
850421 REP Liquid dielectric transformers 
<650KVA 
850421 Liquid dielectric transformers 
<650KVA 
850422 REP Liquid dielectric transformers 650-
10,000KVA 
850422 Liquid dielectric transformers 650-
10,000KVA 
850423 REP Liquid dielectric transformers 
>10,000KVA 
850423 Liquid dielectric transformers 
>10,000KVA 
850431 REP Electric transformers, <1KVA 850431 Electric transformers, <1KVA 
850432 REP Electric transformers, 1-16 KVA 850432 Electric transformers, 1-16 KVA 
850433 REP Electric transformers, 16-500KVA 850433 Electric transformers, 16-500KVA 
850434 REP Electric transformers, >500KVA 850434 Electric transformers, >500KVA 
850440 REP Static converters, nes 850440 Static converters, nes 
850490 SWM Parts of electrical transformers & 
inductors 
850490 Parts of electrical transformers & 
inductors 
850590 REP Electro-magnets, nes 850590 Electro-magnets, nes 
850680 CRE Primary cells, primary batteries 
nes, volume < 300 cc 
850619 Primary cells, primary batteries nes, 
volume < 300 cc 
850720 REP Lead-acid electric accumulators, 
non-vehicle 
850720 Lead-acid electric accumulators, 
non-vehicle 
850980 CRE Home appliances, electric motor 850980 Home appliances, electric motor 
851410 SWM Industrial electric resistance 
furnaces & ovens 
851410 Industrial electric resistance 
furnaces & ovens 
851420 SWM Industrial induction/dielectric 
furnaces & ovens 
851420 Industrial induction/dielectric 
furnaces & ovens 
851430 SWM Industrial/lab electric furnaces & 
ovens 
851430 Industrial/lab electric furnaces & 
ovens 
851490 SWM Parts of industrial electric furnaces, 
ovens 
851490 Parts of industrial electric furnaces, 
ovens 
851629 SWR Space heaters, electric 851629 Space heaters, electric 
853010 CRE Railway electric signal & traffic 
controls 
853010 Railway electric signal & traffic 
controls 
853080 CRE Electric signal & traffic controls 853080 Electric signal & traffic controls 




853090 CRE Parts of electric signal & traffic 
controller 
853090 Parts of electric signal & traffic 
controller 
853710 REP Electrical control & distribution 
boards, <1kV 
853710 Electrical control & distribution 
boards, <1kV 
853720 REP Electrical control & distribution 
boards, >1kV 
853720 Electrical control & distribution 
boards, >1kV 
853921 HEM Filament lamps, tungsten halogen 853921 Filament lamps, tungsten halogen 
853931 HEM Fluorescent lamps, hot cathode 853931 Fluorescent lamps, hot cathode 
853932 HEM Lamps; discharge, (excluding ultra-
violet), mercury or sodium vapour 
lamps, metal halide lamps 
853939 Lamps; discharge, (excluding ultra-
violet), mercury or sodium vapour 
lamps, metal halide lamps 
854140 REP  854140 Photosensitive/PV/LED 
semiconductor device 
854370 WAT Electrical machines and apparatus; 
having individual functions, not 
specified or included elsewhere in 
this chapter, n.e.c 
854380 Electrical machines and apparatus, 
nes 
854390 WAT Parts of electrical 
machines, nes 
854390 Parts of electrical machines, nes 
860110 CRE Rail locomotives, externally 
electrically powered 
860110 Rail locomotives, externally 
electrically powered 
860120 CRE Rail locomotives, electric 
accumulator powered 
860120 Rail locomotives, electric 
accumulator powered 
860210 CRE Rail locomotives, diesel-electric 860210 Rail locomotives, diesel-electric 
860290 CRE Rail locomotives, non-electric 860290 Rail locomotives, non-electric 
860310 CRE Self-propelled railway cars, external 
power 
860310 Self-propelled railway cars, external 
power 
860390 CRE Self-propelled railway cars, nes 860390 Self-propelled railway cars, nes 
860400 CRE Railway maintenance vehicles 860400 Railway maintenance vehicles 
860500 CRE Railway passenger/special purpose 
coaches 
860500 Railway passenger/special purpose 
coaches 
860610 CRE Railway tank cars 860610 Railway tank cars 
860630 CRE Railway cars, self-discharging 860630 Railway cars, self-discharging 
860691 CRE Railway cars, closed & covered 860691 Railway cars, closed & covered 
860692 CRE Railway or tramway goods vans 
and wagons; open, with non-
removable sides of a height 
exceeding 60cm, not self-propelled 
860692 Railway or tramway goods vans 
and wagons; open, with non-
removable sides of a height 
exceeding 60cm, not self-propelled 
860699 CRE Railway cars nes 860699 Railway cars nes 
860711 CRE Driving bogies & bissel-bogies for 
railway 
860711 Driving bogies & bissel-bogies for 
railway 
860712 CRE Bogies & bissel-bogies for railway, 
non-driving 
860712 Bogies & bissel-bogies for railway, 
non-driving 
860719 CRE Railway axles, wheels 860719 Railway axles, wheels 
860721 CRE Air brakes for railway 860721 Air brakes for railway 
860729 CRE Brakes, non-air, for railway 860729 Brakes, non-air, for railway 
860730 CRE Coupling devices for railway 860730 Coupling devices for railway 
860791 CRE Railway locomotive parts, nes 860791 Railway locomotive parts, nes 
860799 CRE Railway rolling stock parts, nes 860799 Railway rolling stock parts, nes 
860800 CRE Signals for rail, waterway, port, 
airfield 
860800 Signals for rail, waterway, port, 
airfield 
870290 CRE Buses, non-diesel 870290 Buses, non-diesel 
870390 CRE Automobiles nes, gas turbine 
powered 
870390 Automobiles nes, gas turbine 
powered 
871200 CRE Bicycles 871200 Bicycles 
871411 CRE Of motorcycles (including mopeds) 
:-- Saddles 
871411 Of motorcycles (including mopeds) 
:-- Saddles 
871419 CRE Motorcycle parts 871419 Motorcycle parts 
871420 CRE Wheelchair parts 871420 Wheelchair parts 
871491 CRE Bicycle frames & forks 871491 Bicycle frames & forks 




871492 CRE Bicycle wheel rims & spokes 871492 Bicycle wheel rims & spokes 
871493 CRE Bicycle hubs, free-wheel sprocket 
wheels 
871493 Bicycle hubs, free-wheel sprocket 
wheels 
871494 CRE Bicycle brakes 871494 Bicycle brakes 
871495 CRE Bicycle saddles 871495 Bicycle saddles 
871496 CRE Bicycle pedals/cranks 871496 Bicycle pedals/cranks 
871499 CRE Bicycle parts, nes 871499 Bicycle parts, nes 
871639 CRE Trailers nes for goods transport 871639 Trailers nes for goods transport 
890790 SWR Buoys, beacons, pontoons 890790 Buoys, beacons, pontoons 
900190 REP Prisms, mirrors & optical elements, 
unmounted 
900190 Prisms, mirrors & optical elements, 
unmounted 
900290 REP Mounted lenses, prisms, optical 
elements 
900290 Mounted lenses, prisms, optical 
elements 
900580 MON Telescopes 900580 Telescopes 
901380 REP Optical devices, appliances and 
instruments, nes 
901380 Optical devices, appliances and 
instruments, nes 
901390 REP Parts and accessories of optical 
appliances nes 
901390 Parts and accessories of optical 
appliances nes 
901530 MON Surveying levels 901530 Surveying levels 
901540 MON Photogrammetrical surveying 
instruments 
901540 Photogrammetrical surveying 
instruments 
901580 MON Surveying instruments nes 901580 Surveying instruments nes 
901590 MON Parts/accessories for surveying 
instruments 
901590 Parts/accessories for surveying 
instruments 
902511 MON Thermometers, liquid-filled 902511 Thermometers, liquid-filled 
902519 MON Thermometers, not liquid filled 902519 Thermometers, not liquid filled 
902610 MON Liquid flow/level measure/check 
equipment 
902610 Liquid flow/level measure/check 
equipment 
902620 MON Pressure measure/check 
equipment 
902620 Pressure measure/check 
equipment 
902680 MON Equipment to measure/check 
gas/liquid properties 
902680 Equipment to measure/check 
gas/liquid properties 
902690 MON Parts of fluid measure/check 
equipment 
902690 Parts of fluid measure/check 
equipment 
902710 MON Gas/smoke analysis apparatus 902710 Gas/smoke analysis apparatus 
902720 MON Chromatographs, electrophoresis 
instruments 
902720 Chromatographs, electrophoresis 
instruments 
902730 MON Spectrometers, 
spectrophotometers 
902730 Spectrometers, spectrophotometers 
902750 MON Instruments using optical radiations 902750 Instruments using optical radiations 
902780 MON Physical/chemical analysis 
equipment 
902780 Physical/chemical analysis 
equipment 
902790 MON Microtomes, scientific analysis 
equip parts 
902790 Microtomes, scientific analysis 
equip parts 
902810 MON Gas supply/calibration meters 902810 Gas supply/calibration meters 
902820 MON Liquid supply/calibration meters 902820 Liquid supply/calibration meters 
902830 HEM Electricity supply, calibration 
meters 
902830 Electricity supply, calibration meters 
902890 HEM Parts/accessories for gas, liquid, 
electricity meter 
902890 Parts/accessories for gas, liquid, 
electricity meter 
903010 MON Ionising radiation measure/detect 
instruments 
903010 Ionising radiation measure/detect 
instruments 
903020 MON Cathode-ray oscilloscopes/graphs 903020 Cathode-ray oscilloscopes/graphs 
903031 MON Electrical multimeters 903031 Electrical multimeters 
903032 MON Multimeters; for measuring or 
checking voltage, current, 
resistance or power, with a 
recording device 
903081 Parts for electric motors & 
generators 
903039 MON Instruments and apparatus; for 
measuring or checking voltage, 
current, resistance or power, with a 
recording device (excluding 
multimeters) 
903081 Parts for electric motors & 
generators 




903084 MON Instruments and apparatus; n.e.c 903039 Voltmeters, non-recording 
903033 MON Instruments and apparatus; for 
measuring or checking voltage, 
current, resistance or power, 
without a recording device 
(excluding multimeters) 
903039 Voltmeters, non-recording 
903089 MON Electrical measurement 
instruments 
903089 Electrical measurement instruments 
903090 MON Parts/access, electr measuring 
instruments 
903090 Parts/access, electr measuring 
instruments 
903110 NVA Machines for balancing mechanical 
parts 
903110 Machines for balancing mechanical 
parts 
903120 MON Test benches for measuring 
equipment 
903120 Test benches for measuring 
equipment 
903149 MON Optical instruments and appliances; 
for measuring or checking, n.e.c 
903140 Other optical instruments and 
appliances 
903180 MON Measuring equipment, nes 903180 Measuring equipment, nes 
903190 MON Parts/access for measuring 
equipment 
903190 Parts/access for measuring 
equipment 
903210 MON Thermostats 903210 Thermostats 
903220 MON Manostats 903220 Manostats 
903281 MON Hydraulic/pneumatic automatic 
controls 
903281 Hydraulic/pneumatic automatic 
controls 
903289 REP Automatic controlling equipment 
nes 
903289 Automatic controlling equipment 
nes 
903290 MON Parts/accessories for automatic 
controls 
903290 Parts/accessories for automatic 
controls 
903300 MON Parts/accessories for 
optical/electric instrument 
903300 Parts/accessories for 
optical/electric instrument 
940510 HEM Chandeliers, ceiling/wall lights 940510 Chandeliers, ceiling/wall lights 
940520 HEM Electric table, bedside & floor 
lamps 
940520 Electric table, bedside & floor lamps 
940540 HEM Electric lamps, fittings, nes 940540 Electric lamps, fittings, nes 




Total no. of 
products 




248   244  
 
Annex 2 
Combined List of Environmental Goods (CLEG) grouped according to their respective 
HS4 Code 
 HS4 Product Code Name HS4 Product Code 
1.  Activated carbon 3802 
2.  Amino-resins 3909 
3.  Other plates of plastics, noncellular and not reinforced 3920 
4.  Other plastic plates, sheets etc. 3921 
5.  Plastic builders' ware 3925 
6.  Synthetic rubber 4002 
7.  Wood carpentry for construction 4418 
8.  Agglomerated cork 4504 
9.  Textile bast fibers 5303 
10.  Vegetable textile fibers 5305 
11.  Artificial monofilament >67dtex t<1mm, strip, straws t<5mm 5405 
12.  Nonwoven textiles 5603 




13.  Twine and ropes of baste fibers 5607 
14.  Nets 5608 
15.  Bags for packing goods 6305 
16.  Mineral wools and insulating materials 6806 
17.  Panels of vegetable fibers 6808 
18.  Articles of cement, of concrete or of artificial stone 6810 
19.  Ceramic sinks, washbasins, and similar sanitary fixtures 6910 
20.  Multiple-walled insulating glass 7008 
21.  Glass mirrors 7009 
22.  Glass fibers 7019 
23.  Railway construction material of iron or steel 7302 
24.  Tubes of cast iron 7303 
25.  Tubes, seamless, of iron or steel 7304 
26.  Other tubes, pipes and hollow profiles of iron or steel 7306 
27.  Structures and their parts, of iron or steel 7308 
28.  Tanks etc. > 300 liters, iron or steel 7309 
29.  Tanks etc. < 300 liters, iron or steel 7310 
30.  Stoves and similar non-electric appliances of iron or steel 7321 
31.  Sanitary ware and parts of iron or steel 7324 
32.  Other cast articles of iron or steel 7325 
33.  Other articles of iron or steel 7326 
34.  Aluminum structures (bridges, towers etc) 7610 
35.  Aluminum containers, >300 liters 7611 
36.  Aluminum containers, <300 liters 7612 
37.  Ornaments, statuettes, etc. of metal 8306 
38.  Steam boilers 8402 
39.  Auxiliary parts for use with boilers 8404 
40.  Water gas generators 8405 
41.  Steam turbines 8406 
42.  Parts suitable for use with spark-ignition engines 8409 
43.  Hydraulic turbines, water wheels and regulators 8410 
44.  Gas turbines 8411 
45.  Other engines and motors 8412 
46.  Pumps for liquids 8413 
47.  Pumps, compressors, fans, etc. 8414 
48.  Air conditioners 8415 
49.  Industrial furnaces 8417 
50.  Refrigerators, freezers 8418 
51.  Equipment for temperature change of materials 8419 
52.  Centrifuges 8421 
53.  Dish washing machines 8422 
54.  Other lifting machinery 8428 
55.  Self-propelled bulldozers, excavators and road rollers 8429 
56.  Machine tools for molding and forging metals 8462 
57.  Machine tools for working wood 8465 
58.  Parts and accessories for metal working machines 8466 




59.  Machinery for working minerals 8474 
60.  Machines n.e.c. 8479 
61.  Appliances for thermostatically controlled valves 8481 
62.  Transmission shafts 8483 
63.  Electric motors and generators 8501 
64.  Electric generating sets and rotary converters 8502 
65.  Parts for use with electric generators 8503 
66.  Electrical transformers 8504 
67.  Electromagnets 8505 
68.  Primary cells and primary batteries 8506 
69.  Batteries 8507 
70.  Electromechanical domestic appliances 8509 
71.  Industrial electric furnaces 8514 
72.  Electric heaters 8516 
73.  Electric signal and traffic controls 8530 
74.  Electrical boards 8537 
75.  Electrical filament 8539 
76.  Semiconductor devices 8541 
77.  Electrical machines with individual functions n.e.c. 8543 
78.  Electric trains 8601 
79.  Other rail locomotives 8602 
80.  Self-propelled railway coaches 8603 
81.  Railway service vehicles 8604 
82.  Railway coaches, not self-propelled 8605 
83.  Railway cars, not self-propelled 8606 
84.  Parts of railway locomotives 8607 
85.  Railway track fixtures 8608 
86.  Buses 8702 
87.  Cars 8703 
88.  Bicycles 8712 
89.  Parts of motorcycles or wheelchairs 8714 
90.  Trailers and semi-trailers 8716 
91.  Other floating structures 8907 
92.  Optical fibers 9001 
93.  Lenses and other optical elements 9002 
94.  Binoculars and telescopes 9005 
95.  Liquid crystal devices 9013 
96.  Surveying instruments 9015 
97.  Thermometers, hydrometers etc. 9025 
98.  Instruments for measuring properties of liquids or gases 9026 
99.  Instruments for physical or chemical analysis 9027 
100.  Gas, liquid or electricity meters 9028 
101.  Instruments for measuring electricity 9030 
102.  Measuring instruments 9031 
103.  Automatic regulating instruments 9032 
104.  Other parts for machines and appliances 9033 




105.  Lamps 9405 
106.  Fishing and hunting equipment 9507 
 
 
